Tarif Fordney-McCumber

Tarif Fordney-McCumber



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Salah satu tren perundangan pertama Kongres Enam Puluh Ketujuh (1921-23) adalah pengumpulan kepemimpinan Republik atas majoriti besar mereka di Dewan dan Senat untuk mengembalikan kebijakan tarif negara kepada proteksionisme. Undang-Undang Tarif Darurat tahun 1921 dirancang hanya sebagai langkah sementara sehingga tindakan yang lebih komprehensif dapat dibuat. Perundangan tarif baru yang utama dipandu melalui Kongres oleh Perwakilan Joseph W. Fordney dari Michigan dan Senator Porter J. McCumber dari North Dakota, dan dengan syarat berikut:

  • menaikkan kadar tarif ke tahap tertinggi pada masa itu, melebihi yang diberikan oleh Kongres Republik sebelumnya dalam Tarif Payne-Aldrich (1909);
  • memberi kuasa besar kepada presiden untuk menaikkan atau menurunkan kadar sebanyak 50 persen pada item yang disarankan oleh Suruhanjaya Tarif, sebuah badan kajian yang dibuat semasa pentadbiran Wilson;
  • memperkenalkan penggunaan "harga jual Amerika" * sebagai cara untuk meningkatkan sifat perlindungan tarif tanpa menaikkan tarif lebih jauh.

Sebagai praktik sebenarnya, presiden Republik tahun 1920-an diprediksi mengabaikan cadangan untuk menurunkan kadar tarif, tetapi secara berkala menawarkan perlindungan kepada pengeluar Amerika dengan menaikkan kadar apabila diberi peluang. Kesan dari Fordney-McCumber Act cukup besar. Kenaikan tarif yang semakin meningkat di A.S. menjadikan negara-negara Eropah lebih sukar untuk melakukan perdagangan dan, dengan itu, melunaskan hutang perang mereka. Selanjutnya, perisai perlindungan terhadap persaingan asing memungkinkan pertumbuhan monopoli di banyak industri Amerika. Tidak dapat diramalkan, negara-negara lain membenci kebijakan Amerika, melakukan protes tanpa hasil, dan akhirnya terpaksa menaikkan tarif mereka sendiri terhadap barang buatan Amerika, sehingga menimbulkan penurunan yang signifikan dalam perdagangan antarabangsa. Tarif Fordney-McCumber meminta sebuah komisi untuk mempertimbangkan pengurangan tarif. Tujuh tahun kemudian, Senator William E. Borah dari Idaho menyatakan komisen itu sebagai kegagalan:

Dalam ingatan saya, catatan ini adalah yang mengecam Suruhanjaya Tarif jika kita menganggap operasinya mempunyai kaitan dengan persoalan penurunan kadar tarif. Dalam hal ini, ia tidak fleksibel seperti yang dapat disangka oleh undang-undang. Saya mengambil keputusan bahawa tidak ada satu pun pengurangan apa pun yang telah dibuat atau dicadangkan oleh Suruhanjaya Tarif; bahawa tidak 1 sen dari beban besar yang dibebankan kepada pengguna negara ini dengan alasan syarat-syarat di mana tarif tersebut diberlakukan telah ditarik oleh tindakan Suruhanjaya Tarif selama tujuh tahun ini ...

* Sebagai contoh, jika sejumlah bahan kimia buatan asing mempunyai nilai di pasaran asalnya $ 60 dan kadar tarif AS untuk barang itu adalah 50 peratus, maka jumlah harga di pasaran Amerika adalah $ 90 ($ 60 + $ 30 ). Walau bagaimanapun, barang itu mungkin kekurangan bekalan di A.S. dan boleh mendapat harga pasaran $ 80. Di bawah Fordney-McCumber, kadar sah 50 peratus akan dikenakan pada harga jual Amerika yang lebih tinggi dan menghasilkan harga keseluruhan $ 120 ($ 80 + 40). Kadarnya tidak berubah, tetapi lebih sukar bagi pengeluar asing untuk memasarkan produk mereka di AS. Lihat aspek lain dalam dasar domestik Harding. Tarif? Lihat juga ringkasan jadual tarif.


Tarif Fordney-McCumber - Sejarah

Ilustrasi menunjukkan sekumpulan kanak-kanak berlabel "Sugar Trust (makan" Dingley Baby Food "), Trust Clothing, Tobacco Trust, Steel Trust, Beef Trust, Paper Trust, [dan] Coal Trust", ada yang bermain dengan kasar dengan sedikit anak patung berlabel "Penjual kecil, Orang Awam, Pengeluar Bebas, [dan] Pengguna", boneka lain, "Cattle Raiser" telah dibuang. Di latar belakang, di sebelah kiri, seorang wanita berlabel "Dingley Tariff" sedang duduk di kerusi dengan seorang anak di pangkuannya, dan di sebelah kanan adalah sebuah bangunan yang dikenali sebagai "Rumah untuk Industri Bayi". Di latar depan kiri, Joseph Cannon sedang berbicara dengan Theodore Roosevelt, yang sedang memegang kertas berlabel "Revisi Tarif".

Tarif ini diluluskan pada tahun 1922. Menaikkan tugas menjadi rata-rata 38 persen. Ini terutama memberi perlindungan kepada industri kimia dan ubat-ubatan yang telah berkembang semasa Perang Dunia I.

Industri dan pertanian AS berkembang maju semasa Perang Dunia I. AS membekalkan sekutu dan makanan kepada Sekutu. Pada tahun 1919 pengeluaran ladang mencapai $ 17.7 Billion. Dua tahun kemudian pengeluarannya turun menjadi $ 10.5 Billion, yang menyebabkan kemurungan di ladang Amerika. Ketakutannya ialah penurunan juga akan berlaku pada Industri Amerika.

Setelah Presiden Harding memenangkan pemilihannya, Republikan dengan cepat meloloskan Tarif Muncul pada tahun 1921. Tujuannya adalah untuk menaikkan tarif dengan cepat untuk menggantikan tarif yang rendah di bawah Tarif Underwood Simmons yang telah dipromosikan oleh Presiden Wilson. Tarif baru dengan serta-merta meningkatkan tarif pada sebilangan besar barang termasuk import pertanian seperti gandum. Tarif Darurat disahkan sebagai jeda berhenti sehingga sistem tarif yang lebih komprehensif dapat dilaksanakan. Tarif kecemasan berkuat kuasa sebaik sahaja Harding mengambil alih jawatan dan dapat menandatangani tarif tersebut.

Rumah tersebut mengadakan pendengaran mengenai cara terbaik untuk menerapkan tarif dan memutuskan topi yang mereka namakan sebagai kaedah Penilaian Amerika. Ini adalah sistem yang mengira nilai produk Amerika berbanding dengan kos di negara asal. Maka tarif perbezaan akan dikenakan pada barang. Sebilangan besar Demokrat menentang rang undang-undang itu dengan mendakwa ia hanya akan menaikkan harga kepada orang Amerika. RUU itu meluluskan Dewan 289 hingga 127 pada 21 Julai 1921

Senat kemudian membuat rang undang-undang tersebut. Mereka memilih kaedah Nilai Amerika dan sebaliknya memberi kemampuan kepada Presiden untuk menaikkan tarif pada barang berdasarkan penentuan nilainya. Perbincangan mengenai RUU di Senat berlangsung lama, tetapi akhirnya ia meluluskan Senat 48 hingga 22 pada 19 Ogos 1922. Dewan dan Senat kemudian menyelesaikan perbezaan mereka dengan bersetuju untuk mewujudkan komisi Tarif yang akan menasihati Presiden mengenai apa yang harus menetapkan tarif di. Pada akhirnya di bawah tarif Fordney McCumber, duti rata-rata untuk semua import adalah 14% berbanding 9% di bawah Underwood Simmons, dan pada barang yang dapat dikutip adalah 38.5% berbanding dengan tugas 27% di bawah Underwood -Simmons. Walau bagaimanapun, rata-rata duti sedikit lebih rendah berbanding dengan tugas Payne Aldrich 1909.


Patrick Buchanan: Tarif - Cukai yang Membuat Amerika Hebat

Ketika limonya membawanya bekerja di Gedung Putih pada hari Isnin, Larry Kudlow tidak mungkin senang dengan tajuk utama di The Washington Post: "Kudlow Bercanggah dengan Trump mengenai Tarif."

Kisahnya bermula: "Pengarah Majlis Ekonomi Nasional, Lawrence Kudlow mengakui pada hari Ahad bahawa pengguna Amerika akhirnya membayar tarif pentadbiran terhadap import China, bertentangan dengan dakwaan Presiden Trump yang tidak tepat berulang kali bahawa orang Cina memenuhi undang-undang tersebut."

Sebagai evangelis perdagangan bebas, Kudlow mengakui Fox News bahawa pengguna membayar tarif pada produk yang dibuat di luar negara yang mereka beli di sini di A.S.

Tarif boleh digambarkan sebagai cukai penjualan atau penggunaan yang dibayar oleh pengguna, tetapi tarif juga merupakan budi bicara dan cukai pilihan.

Sekiranya anda memilih untuk tidak membeli barang Cina dan sebaliknya membeli barang setanding yang dibuat di negara lain atau AS, maka anda tidak membayar tarifnya.

China kehilangan penjualan. Inilah sebabnya mengapa Beijing, yang menghasilkan lebihan perdagangan tahunan $ 350 bilion hingga $ 400 bilion dengan perbelanjaan kami melolong. Sekiranya Donald Trump mengenakan tarif 25% ke atas semua $ 500 bilion eksport China ke AS, itu akan melumpuhkan ekonomi China. Kilang yang mencari jalan masuk ke pasaran A.S. pasti akan panik dari Kerajaan Tengah.

Tarif adalah cukai yang menjadikan Amerika hebat. Itu adalah cukai yang disandarkan oleh yang pertama dan terbesar dari negarawan awal kita, sebelum kedatangan globalis Woodrow Wilson dan FDR.

Tarif, untuk melindungi pengilang dan pekerjaan, merupakan jalan Parti Republik untuk berkuasa dan makmur pada abad ke-19 dan ke-20, sebelum munculnya pertubuhan liberal Rockefeller Timur dan pengangkatannya terhadap ajaran perdagangan bebas yang bebas dari Britain.

Akta Tarif tahun 1789 diberlakukan dengan tujuan yang dinyatakan, "dorongan dan perlindungan pembuatan." Ini adalah tindakan kedua yang diluluskan oleh Kongres pertama yang dipimpin oleh Speaker James Madison. Ia dibuat oleh Alexander Hamilton dan ditandatangani oleh Presiden Washington.

Selepas Perang 1812, Presiden Madison, yang disokong oleh Henry Clay dan John Calhoun dan mantan Presiden Jefferson dan Adams, menetapkan Tarif tahun 1816 untuk membuat harga tekstil Inggeris daripada persaingan, sehingga orang Amerika akan membina kilang-kilang baru dan menangkap pasaran AS yang sedang berkembang pesat . Ianya berhasil.

Tarif membiayai Perang Mr Lincoln. Tarif tahun 1890 menanggung nama Anggota Kongres Ohio dan Presiden William McKinley yang akan datang, yang mengatakan bahawa pengilang asing "tidak mempunyai hak atau menuntut persamaan dengan syarikat kita sendiri. Dia tidak membayar cukai. Dia tidak melakukan tugas sivil."

Itulah patriotisme ekonomi, mengutamakan Amerika dan Amerika.

Tarif Fordney-McCumber memberikan pendapatan kepada Presiden Warren Harding dan Calvin Coolidge untuk mengimbangi pemotongan cukai pendapatan Wilson, yang menyulut yang paling dinamis dekad - Roaring '20-an.

Bahawa Tarif Smoot-Hawley menyebabkan Depresi pada tahun 1930-an adalah mitos Perjanjian Baru di mana pelajar sekolah Amerika telah didoktrinasi selama beberapa dekad.

Depresi bermula dengan kejatuhan pasaran saham pada tahun 1929, sembilan bulan sebelum Smoot-Hawley menjadi undang-undang. Penjahat sebenarnya: Rizab Persekutuan, yang gagal mengisi sepertiga bekalan wang yang telah dihapuskan oleh ribuan kegagalan bank.

Milton Friedman mengajar kami bahawa.

Tarif adalah cukai, tetapi tujuannya bukan hanya untuk meningkatkan pendapatan tetapi untuk menjadikan sebuah negara yang bebas dari ekonomi dari negara lain, dan untuk membawa warganya bergantung satu sama lain daripada entiti asing.

Prinsip yang terlibat dalam tarif adalah sama dengan yang digunakan oleh kolej dan universiti A.S. yang mengenakan bayaran tinggi kepada pelajar asing daripada rakan mereka di Amerika.

Apa patriot yang akan menyerahkan kemerdekaan ekonomi negaranya kepada "tangan yang tidak kelihatan" dari Adam Smith dalam sistem yang dibuat oleh intelektual yang setia kepada ideologi, bukan rakyat?

Negara besar apa yang pernah dibina oleh peniaga bebas?

Perdagangan bebas adalah dasar kuasa yang semakin pudar dan gagal, melepasi puncaknya. Pada setengah abad setelah perundangan Undang-undang Jagung, Inggeris menunjukkan kebodohan perdagangan bebas.

Mereka memulakan separuh kedua abad ke-19 dengan ekonomi dua kali ganda daripada AS dan mengakhirinya dengan ekonomi separuh daripada negara kita, dan disamakan oleh Jerman, yang, di bawah Bismarck, mengadopsi apa yang dikenali sebagai Sistem Amerika.

Dari negara-negara yang telah berkembang menjadi keutamaan ekonomi dalam beberapa abad terakhir - Inggeris sebelum tahun 1850, Amerika Syarikat antara 1789 dan 1914, Jepun, China selepas perang dalam beberapa dekad terakhir - berapa banyak yang melakukannya melalui perdagangan bebas? Tiada. Semua mengamalkan nasionalisme ekonomi.

Masalah untuk Presiden Trump?

Setelah sebuah negara terpikat dengan barang murah yang disediakan perdagangan bebas narkotik, ia jarang dapat membebaskan diri. Kehilangan kemerdekaan ekonominya diikuti oleh hilangnya kebebasan politiknya, hilangnya kehebatannya dan, akhirnya, hilangnya identiti nasionalnya.

Brexit adalah tangisan rakyat Britain yang telah kehilangan kemerdekaannya dan sangat menginginkannya kembali.

Patrick J. Buchanan adalah pengarang "Nixon's White House Wars: The Battles That Made and Broke a President and Divided America Forever."


Teori Peraturan dan Penerapannya pada Dasar Perdagangan

  • Pengarang: Wendy L. Hansen
  • Penerbit: Laluan Laluan
  • Tarikh Tayangan: 2017-10-10
  • Genre: Perniagaan & Ekonomi
  • Halaman: 138
  • ISBN 10: 9781351580632

Tujuan buku ini, pertama kali diterbitkan pada tahun 1990, adalah untuk menjelaskan berbagai tahap perlindungan dari persaingan asing di seluruh industri AS dengan memfokuskan pada faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi penawaran dan permintaan untuk pengaturan perdagangan. Keadaan apa yang mendorong industri meminta perlindungan, dan faktor apa yang mempengaruhi keputusan pemerintah untuk memberikan atau tidak perlindungan itu? Faktor apa yang paling tepat menjelaskan tindakan kumpulan minat dan keputusan pengawal selia? Kajian terperinci ini menjawab persoalan utama ini dan banyak lagi.


Tindak balas

Tarif itu disokong oleh parti Republikan dan konservatif dan umumnya ditentang oleh Parti Demokratik dan progresif liberal. Salah satu maksud tarif adalah untuk membantu mereka yang kembali dari Perang Dunia I memiliki peluang pekerjaan yang lebih besar. Rakan dagang mengeluh segera. Negara-negara Eropah yang terjejas oleh Perang Dunia I meminta akses untuk eksport mereka ke pasaran Amerika untuk membuat pembayaran ke A.S. untuk pinjaman perang. Wakil Demokrat Cordell Hull berkata, "Pasaran asing kita bergantung pada kecekapan pengeluaran kita dan tarif negara-negara di mana kita akan menjual. Tarif [tinggi] kita sendiri adalah faktor penting di masing-masing. Mereka melukai yang pertama dan mengundang yang terakhir . "

Lima tahun setelah berlakunya tarif, rakan dagang Amerika telah menaikkan tarif mereka sendiri secara signifikan. Perancis menaikkan tarif kenderaan automatik dari 45% hingga 100%, Sepanyol menaikkan tarif barang Amerika sebanyak 40%, dan Jerman dan Itali menaikkan tarif gandum. [6]

Pada tahun 1928, Henry Ford menyerang Tarif Fordney-McCumber, dengan alasan bahawa industri automobil Amerika tidak memerlukan perlindungan kerana menguasai pasaran domestik, dan minat mereka adalah untuk mengeluarkan penjualan asing. [7]

Sebilangan petani menentang Tarif Fordney-McCumber, menyalahkannya kerana kemerosotan pertanian. Persekutuan Biro Ladang Amerika mendakwa bahawa kerana tarif, kenaikan harga bulu mentah kepada petani $ 27 juta. Senator Demokrat David Walsh mencabar tarif tersebut dengan berpendapat bahawa petani adalah pengeksport bersih dan tidak memerlukan perlindungan kerana mereka bergantung pada pasaran asing untuk menjual lebihan mereka. Senator menunjukkan bahawa pada tahun pertama tarif itu, kos sara hidup naik lebih tinggi daripada tahun lain kecuali selama perang, menyajikan tinjauan Jabatan Tenaga Kerja, di mana semua 32 kota yang dinilai telah mengalami kenaikan biaya hidup. Contohnya, kos makanan meningkat 16.5% di Chicago dan 9.4% di New York. Harga pakaian dinaikkan sebanyak 5.5% di Buffalo, New York, dan 10.2% di Chicago. Republikan Frank W. Murphy, ketua Biro Pertanian Minnesota, juga mendakwa bahawa masalahnya bukan pada harga produk pertanian dunia, tetapi barang yang harus dibeli oleh petani. Ahli Kongres Republikan W. R. Green, ketua Jawatankuasa Cara dan Cara House, mengakui bahawa statistik Biro Penyelidikan Biro Pertanian Amerika yang menunjukkan petani telah kehilangan lebih dari $ 300 juta setiap tahun akibat tarif tersebut. [8]


Tarif Fordney-McCumber

Tarif Fordney-McCumber di Amerika Syarikat Pengenalan Tarif Fordney-McCumber, 1922 Dalam konteks sejarah perundangan: Didorong oleh Kongres pada tahun 1922, ia menaikkan kadar tarif untuk melindungi dan mempromosikan perniagaan besar. Sumber Dalam konteks sejarah perundangan: Lihat Juga Antarabangsa [& # 8230]

Entri Berkaitan:

Undang-undang adalah Nafsu kita

Entri ini mengenai Tarif Fordney-McCumber telah diterbitkan di bawah syarat-syarat lesen Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 (CC BY 3.0), yang membenarkan penggunaan dan pembiakan tanpa had, dengan syarat pengarang atau pengarang entri Tarif Fordney-McCumber dan Ensiklopedia Undang-Undang dalam setiap kes dikreditkan sebagai sumber kemasukan Tarif Fordney-McCumber. Harap maklum bahawa lesen CC BY ini berlaku untuk beberapa kandungan teks Fordney-McCumber Tariff, dan bahawa beberapa gambar dan elemen teks atau bukan teks lain mungkin dilindungi oleh pengaturan hak cipta khas. Untuk panduan mengenai mengutip Tarif Fordney-McCumber (memberikan atribusi seperti yang dikehendaki oleh lesen CC BY), sila lihat di bawah cadangan kami mengenai & quotKutip Entri ini & quot.


Apakah kesan tarif tahun 1920 pada perdagangan dunia?

Akta dan tarif dikenakan oleh Amerika berniaga rakan kongsi pembalasan merupakan faktor utama pengurangan eksport dan import Amerika sebanyak 67% pada tahun 2004 Kemurungan. Ahli ekonomi dan sejarawan ekonomi berpandangan sepakat bahawa petikan Smoot & ndashHawley Tarif memburukkan lagi Kemurungan Besar.

Di sebelah atas, apakah kesan tarif Fordney McCumber pada tahun 1922? The Fordney& ndashTarif McCumber tahun 1922 adalah undang-undang yang mengangkat Amerika tarif pada banyak barang yang diimport untuk melindungi kilang dan ladang. Kongres AS memperlihatkan sikap pro-perniagaan dalam menyelesaikannya tarif dan dalam mempromosikan perdagangan asing dengan memberikan pinjaman besar kepada Eropah. Itu, seterusnya, membeli lebih banyak barang AS.

Juga perlu diketahui, mengapa tarif dilewatkan pada tahun 1920-an?

Ini adalah diberlakukan, sebahagiannya, untuk menenangkan konstituen domestik, tetapi akhirnya mereka berfungsi untuk menghalang kerjasama dan perdagangan ekonomi antarabangsa pada akhir 1920-an dan awal tahun 1930-an. Tinggi tarif adalah cara bukan sahaja melindungi industri bayi, tetapi menjana pendapatan bagi kerajaan persekutuan.


Akta Tarif Smoot-Hawley

Editor kami akan menyemak apa yang telah anda kirimkan dan menentukan apakah akan menyemak semula artikel tersebut.

Akta Tarif Smoot-Hawley, secara rasmi Akta Tarif Amerika Syarikat tahun 1930, juga dipanggil Akta Tarif Hawley-Smoot, Undang-undang A.S. (17 Jun 1930) yang menaikkan duti import untuk melindungi perniagaan dan petani Amerika, menambah tekanan pada iklim ekonomi antarabangsa dari Depresi Besar. Tindakan itu diambil namanya dari penaja utamanya, Senator Reed Smoot dari Utah, ketua Jawatankuasa Kewangan Senat, dan Wakil Willis Hawley dari Oregon, ketua Jawatankuasa Cara dan Cara House. Ini adalah undang-undang terakhir di mana Kongres A.S. menetapkan kadar tarif sebenar.

Apakah Akta Tarif Smoot-Hawley?

Secara resmi disebut Akta Tarif Amerika Serikat tahun 1930, undang-undang ini, yang awalnya bertujuan untuk menolong petani Amerika, menaikkan duti import yang sudah tinggi pada sejumlah barang pertanian dan industri sebanyak 20 persen. Ia ditaja oleh Senator Reed Smoot dari Utah dan Rep. Willis Hawley dari Oregon dan ditandatangani pada 17 Jun 1930 oleh Pres. Herbert Hoover.

Bagaimana Akta Tarif Smoot-Hawley mempengaruhi ekonomi Amerika?

Ahli ekonomi memberi amaran terhadap tindakan itu, dan pasaran saham bereaksi negatif terhadap tindakannya, yang kurang lebih bertepatan dengan permulaan Depresi Besar. Ini menaikkan harga impor ke titik sehingga mereka tidak terjangkau untuk semua kecuali orang kaya, dan secara dramatis menurunkan jumlah barang yang dieksport, sehingga menyebabkan kegagalan bank, terutama di wilayah pertanian.

Mengapa Akta Tarif Smoot-Hawley mempunyai kesan yang begitu dramatik terhadap perdagangan?

Tarif hukuman menaikkan tugas sehingga negara tidak dapat menjual barang di Amerika Syarikat. Ini mendorong tarif pembalasan, menjadikan import mahal untuk semua orang dan menyebabkan kegagalan bank di negara-negara yang memberlakukan tarif tersebut. Sebanyak dua lusin negara membuat tarif tinggi dalam dua tahun sejak berlakunya Akta Tarif Smoot-Hawley, yang menyebabkan penurunan perdagangan antarabangsa sebanyak 65 peratus antara tahun 1929 dan 1934.

Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act menaikkan kadar tarif Amerika Syarikat yang sudah tinggi. Pada tahun 1922 Kongres telah membuat undang-undang Fordney-McCumber, yang merupakan antara tarif perlindungan yang paling menghukum dalam sejarah negara, menaikkan rata-rata cukai import menjadi sekitar 40 persen. Tarif Fordney-McCumber mendorong pembalasan dari pemerintah Eropah tetapi tidak banyak yang menjejaskan kemakmuran A.S. Sepanjang tahun 1920-an, bagaimanapun, ketika petani Eropah pulih dari Perang Dunia I dan rakan mereka dari Amerika menghadapi persaingan yang sengit dan penurunan harga kerana pengeluaran berlebihan, kepentingan pertanian A.S. melobi kerajaan persekutuan untuk melindungi daripada import pertanian. Dalam kampanye presidennya pada tahun 1928, calon Republikan Herbert Hoover berjanji untuk menaikkan tarif atas barang pertanian, tetapi setelah dia mengambil pejabat pelobi dari sektor ekonomi lain mendorongnya untuk mendukung kenaikan yang lebih luas. Walaupun kenaikan tarif disokong oleh kebanyakan Republikan, usaha untuk menaikkan duti import gagal pada tahun 1929, sebahagian besarnya disebabkan oleh penentangan dari pusat Parti Republik di Senat A.S. Namun, sebagai tanggapan terhadap keruntuhan pasar saham tahun 1929, proteksionisme mendapat kekuatan, dan, meskipun undang-undang tarif kemudian dilewati hanya dengan margin yang sempit (44-42) di Senat, undang-undang itu dengan mudah diluluskan di Dewan Perwakilan. Walaupun ada petisyen dari lebih dari 1.000 ahli ekonomi yang mendesaknya untuk memveto undang-undang tersebut, Hoover menandatangani undang-undang tersebut pada 17 Jun 1930.

Smoot-Hawley menyumbang kepada hilangnya keyakinan awal di Wall Street dan menandakan pengasingan A.S. Dengan menaikkan tarif rata-rata sekitar 20 persen, itu juga mendorong pembalasan dari pemerintah asing, dan banyak bank luar negeri mulai gagal. (Kerana undang-undang menetapkan tarif tarif khusus dan ad valorem [iaitu, harga berdasarkan nilai produk], menentukan kenaikan peratusan tepat dalam kadar tarif sukar dan menjadi topik perbahasan di kalangan ahli ekonomi.) Dalam dua tahun, sekitar dua lusin negara-negara mengadopsi tugas "pengemis-tetangga-tetangga" yang serupa, yang menjadikan ekonomi dunia yang sudah terkepung dan mengurangkan perdagangan global. Import A.S. dan eksport A.S. ke Eropah turun sekitar dua pertiga antara tahun 1929 dan 1932, sementara perdagangan global secara keseluruhan merosot pada tahap yang sama dalam empat tahun undang-undang tersebut berkuatkuasa.

Pada tahun 1934 Presiden Franklin D. Roosevelt menandatangani Akta Perjanjian Perdagangan Balik, mengurangkan tahap tarif dan mempromosikan liberalisasi perdagangan dan kerjasama dengan pemerintah asing. Beberapa pemerhati berpendapat bahawa tarif, dengan memperdalam Depresi Besar, mungkin telah menyumbang pada peningkatan ekstremisme politik, memungkinkan para pemimpin seperti Adolf Hitler untuk meningkatkan kekuatan politik mereka dan mendapatkan kekuatan.


Bagaimana tarif tinggi mempengaruhi ekonomi? Mereka merosakkan ekonomi dengan mengehadkan kemampuan pengeluar Amerika & # 8217 menjual barang di luar negara. & # 8230 Ekonomi pada awal tahun 1929 tampak kuat dan makmur, tetapi pada tahun 1932, banyak orang dan perniagaan menderita secara langsung dari ekonomi yang buruk.

Akta Tarif Smoot-Hawley menaikkan kadar tarif Amerika Syarikat yang sudah tinggi. Pada tahun 1922 Kongres telah memberlakukan Undang-undang Fordney-McCumber, yang merupakan antara tarif perlindungan yang paling menghukum dalam sejarah negara ini, menaikkan cukai import rata-rata menjadi sekitar 40 persen.


Tamatkan Tabu Tarif

Rennae LaPan memasang pintu keluli dan aluminium di kilang trak pikap GM & # 8217s Chevrolet Silverado dan GMC Sierra di Fort Wayne, Ind., 25 Julai 2018. (John Gress / Reuters)

Bagi elit dasar Amerika, terdapat beberapa bidah yang lebih besar daripada tarif. Dalam dunia kertas putih kumpulan pemikir dan perbincangan panel akademik, tarif menjadikan syarikat Marxisme berada dalam asbin sejarah, yang kononnya didiskreditkan oleh model matematik ahli ekonomi ortodoks dan tidak disenangi oleh setiap pemerintahan presiden sejak Herbert Hoover.

Skeptisisme yang terpaku tidak dapat ditandingi oleh pemerintahan Trump, yang menghancurkan konsensus selama puluhan tahun dengan menaikkan tarif rata-rata untuk barang-barang China dari 3 persen menjadi hampir 20 persen. Perang perdagangan baru ini telah dikutuk oleh hampir setiap suku pendapat dasar arus perdana, namun daripada mengembalikan status quo sebelum Trump, pentadbiran Biden yang baru nampaknya bersedia untuk meneruskan kebijakan yang sepatutnya mundur. Biden - peniaga bebas kerjaya yang menyokong NAFTA dan kenaikan China ke Organisasi Perdagangan Dunia - tidak mempunyai rancangan untuk membatalkan tarif Trump China.

Presiden yang paling polarisasi dalam ingatan moden nampaknya menjalin konsensus baru untuk menyokong salah satu alat ekonomi yang paling tidak disukai. Tarif secara tiba-tiba merangkak keluar dari asbin sejarah, dan Republikan pasca-Trump harus memutuskan apakah mereka akan berusaha mendorongnya masuk kembali. Tetapi itu memerlukan pemahaman yang adil mengenai apa yang boleh dan tidak dapat dilakukan oleh tarif - dan beberapa dasar alat lebih disalahfahami daripada tarif.

Lebih banyak dalam Tarif

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Sarung Berasaskan Navarro & # 8217s untuk Tarif

Republikan dan Demokrat neoliberal telah lama bercerita tentang penggunaan tarif Amerika seperti ini: Pada masa kejayaan laissez-faire abad ke-19, Amerika menikmati pertumbuhan dan perindustrian yang belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya. Tetapi seiring abad ke-20, industri domestik mulai bersikeras melindungi dari persaingan asing dan berjaya melobi tarif, yang berpuncak pada Smoot-Hawley Tariff tahun 1930, yang membantu mengubah kejatuhan pasaran saham menjadi Depresi Besar. Tarif menjadi semakin usang di dunia pasca perang setelah para ahli ekonomi membuktikan bahawa mereka menyebabkan kerugian dan pembalasan berat badan dan hanya berguna untuk industri mati yang tidak dapat menangani persaingan, dan untuk kerajaan yang korup yang menggunakannya untuk memilih pemenang dan yang kalah.

Hampir setiap bahagian cerita ini salah. Amerika Syarikat menghabiskan sebahagian besar abad ke-19 sebagai ekonomi yang paling dilindungi di negara maju, menjadi juggernaut pembuatan walaupun kadar tarif rata-rata melayang antara 20 persen dan 50 persen (rata-rata hari ini adalah 2 persen). Tarif Smoot-Hawley yang dikatakan bencana bahkan bukan kenaikan terbesar dekad ini berdasarkan peratusan. Itu adalah tarif Fordney-McCumber yang sekarang dilupakan pada tahun 1922, yang diikuti bukan oleh kemurungan tetapi oleh Roaring Twenties. Smoot-Hawley sendiri tidak menyebabkan Kemelesetan Besar, yang dilakukan Fed. Barry Eichengreen bahkan berpendapat bahawa kesan Smoot-Hawley ke Amerika Syarikat kemungkinan besar akan meningkat, dengan harga menurun lebih rendah di A.S. berbanding pesaing asingnya.

Tarif dapat memberi kesan ini sebahagiannya kerana teori tarif yang optimum, konsep yang dikembangkan oleh Nicholas Kaldor pada tahun 1940. Teori ini menyatakan bahawa untuk ekonomi yang besar dengan daya beli yang besar di pasaran dunia, mengimport import dapat meningkatkan kekayaan negara dengan menurunkan permintaan (dan oleh itu harga) untuk barang yang diimport dan permintaan yang meningkat untuk barang domestik yang dieksport ke dunia. Itu bergantung, bagaimanapun, pada rakan dagang tidak membalas.

Sayangnya, sepanjang sejarah baru-baru ini, kami telah menjadi rakan dagang yang tidak membalas dendam. Komitmen ideologi untuk perdagangan bebas menjadikan A.S. menjadi "tanda" dalam rundingan perdagangan antarabangsa, yang membolehkan rakan kongsi kami masuk ke pasaran kami tanpa memberikan akses yang sama kepada eksport Amerika sebagai balasannya. Tarif tidak terutama berkaitan dengan perlindungan tetapi mengenai leverage. Tanpa adanya ancaman tarif, pesaing bebas melanggar peraturan dan mencipta kelebihan asimetri.

Sebagai contoh, di bawah Obama, tarif masuk untuk eksport China membawa tarif rata-rata 3 persen sementara duti Cina terhadap eksport kita rata-rata 8 persen, untuk mengatakan halangan perdagangan bukan tarif. Pengaturan yang tidak setara itu menyumbang kepada defisit perdagangan tertinggi Amerika, dengan penggunaan melebihi pengeluaran sekitar 2 hingga 4 peratus daripada KDNK selama hampir 20 tahun terakhir, untuk defisit barang dan perkhidmatan gabungan sebanyak $ 605 bilion hingga November 2020.

Konservatif telah lama menegaskan bahawa defisit perdagangan tidak penting. Winks polisi kerusi gemar menunjukkan bahawa anda mengalami defisit perdagangan dengan Shake Shack, namun kedua-duanya lebih baik dari pertukaran ini. Tetapi seperti yang ditunjukkan oleh Wakil Perdagangan AS Robert Lighthizer, jika anda mengalami defisit perdagangan dengan semua orang, tanpa aliran pendapatan positif bersih dari menjual barang atau perkhidmatan anda sendiri, anda hanya berhutang, dan penggunaan Shackburgers bergantung kepada kesabaran syarikat kad kredit.

Ada yang percaya bahawa kesabaran pemiutang hampir tidak terbatas untuk Amerika Syarikat, kerana status mata wang rizab dolar bermaksud rakan dagang kita akan selalu menerima IOU dalam bentuk dolar dalam bentuk Perbendaharaan A.S. untuk membiayai penggunaan kita. Tetapi defisit perdagangan semestinya disekat oleh penjualan aset dan juga hutang - yang bermaksud kita melelongkan keupayaan produktif masa depan kita untuk menggunakan lebih banyak pada masa sekarang.

Hutang tanpa kekurangan juga: Apabila pengeksport seperti China dan Jerman mengitar semula keuntungan mereka menjadi Perbendaharaan, ia menurunkan kadar faedah dan merangsang pinjaman - dan gelembung kewangan - pada masa yang sama kekurangan pengeluaran mereka memperdalam deindustrialisasi Amerika. Seperti yang dikatakan oleh Warren Buffett, "negara kita telah bersikap seperti keluarga yang sangat kaya yang memiliki ladang yang sangat besar. Untuk menggunakan 4 peratus lebih banyak daripada yang kita hasilkan - itu adalah defisit perdagangan - kita sama-sama menjual sebilangan ladang dan meningkatkan gadai janji atas apa yang masih kita miliki. " Sekiranya ini tidak dapat berlangsung selamanya, akhirnya ia akan berhenti.

Defisit perdagangan yang berterusan juga membawa kesan pengagihan. Setiap pekerja Amerika adalah pengguna dan pengeluar. Apabila kita mengimport lebih banyak daripada yang kita eksport, pengeluar domestik menghadapi lebih banyak persaingan tanpa peningkatan permintaan tenaga kerja mereka. Ini menyusahkan pengeluar Amerika untuk menolong (buat masa ini) pengguna Amerika - suatu pengaturan yang kebanyakan orang Amerika tidak menganggapnya sebagai pertukaran yang sama. Hasil pilihan ini dapat dilihat dalam penyelidikan David Autor, David Dorn, dan Gordon Hanson, yang mendapati bahawa pendedahan terhadap tekanan import China meramalkan penurunan gaji lelaki, yang pada gilirannya meramalkan peningkatan kematian dan kelahiran luar nikah. Model ekonomi mengatakan bahawa pekerja ini akan berpindah ke sektor yang lebih cekap, tetapi itu tidak berlaku. Sekiranya kita ingin meminimumkan kemudaratan ini, kita harus mencari perdagangan yang seimbang, sehingga, seperti yang ditunjukkan oleh Oren Cass, "pekerja tidak hanya menghadapi persaingan yang lebih besar tetapi juga menikmati peluang yang lebih besar."

Tarif selalunya bukan kaedah terbaik untuk mengimbangi perdagangan. Memilih barang mana yang akan dikenakan cukai mengundang pencarian dan lobi, dan polisi itu boleh memberi kesan yang tidak diingini kerana kerumitan rantaian bekalan dengan input yang melompat dari satu negara ke negara sebelum perhimpunan terakhir. Bertujuan untuk perdagangan seimbang hanya bermaksud mempertimbangkan konteks di mana tarif dapat menjadi bagian dari penyelesaian bersama dengan pendekatan lain. Terlalu lama, keterikatan ideologi terhadap perdagangan bebas telah menyekat siasatan.

Keselamatan negara
Keperluan keselamatan negara telah menjadikan perdagangan bebas sejak terbitnya Kekayaan Bangsa, ketika Adam Smith menyatakan bahawa "jika ada pembuatan tertentu yang diperlukan, memang untuk pembelaan masyarakat, mungkin tidak selalu bijaksana untuk bergantung kepada jiran kita untuk mendapatkan bekalan." The Trump administration invoked that logic when it used Section 232 to place a 25 percent tariff on imported steel and a 10 percent tariff on imported aluminum, claiming that national security required the U.S. to safeguard its domestic capacity to produce defense inputs. The context for the tariffs was a longstanding policy by Chinese manufacturers to overproduce these metals, depressing world prices and giving China a majority share of world production.

The tariffs immediately attracted critics. Most of our imported steel and aluminum comes from allies like Canada and the European Union, not adversaries such as Russia and China, supposedly ensuring that our supply of needed goods would remain secure in a crisis. And the economic models said that even if prices spiked owing to shortage, the price signal would pull new producers into the market and quickly boost supply.

The COVID-19 pandemic put those theories to the test, and the results were bleak. Having offshored its capacity to produce personal protective equipment (PPE), medical devices, and pharmaceuticals, the U.S. found itself dependent on global supply chains that were falling apart. Adversaries and allies alike restricted the export of needed goods to ensure that their home markets were adequately supplied, and the process to bring new production online took a while as the body count climbed.

The lesson of the crisis is that productive capacity is not liquid, growing or shrinking to instantly match demand. It exists within a fragile ecosystem — the “industrial commons” — made up of human know-how within many interconnected, geographically rooted supply chains. When a supply chain gets offshored and the know-how migrates elsewhere, it has cascading effects, and can’t be recreated just because there’s an emergency. Harvard Business School professors Gary Pisano and Willy Shih explain this cascade:

Once manufacturing is outsourced, process-engineering expertise can’t be maintained, since it depends on daily interactions with manufacturing. Without process-engineering capabilities, companies find it increasingly difficult to conduct advanced research on next-generation process technologies. Without the ability to develop such new processes, they find they can no longer develop new products.

If the manufacturing gets offshored, the engineering, research, and design will follow, because these activities reap efficiency gains by locating close to the assembly line. Then you lose the future. This dynamic is well underway in the U.S., where R&D that American firms used to conduct in America is increasingly moving to East Asia. Tariffs alone are unlikely to reverse this trend, but in conjunction with industrial policy to support firms in bearing reshoring costs, it can work. For example, Taiwan has successfully reshored over $33 billion of investment from China through a “non-red supply chain” policy of tax credits, subsidies, and other state support to reshoring firms. It wouldn’t have succeeded without U.S. tariffs on China changing the cost structure of exporting from China.

This means tariffs that disincentivize the offshoring of manufacturing can be part of a strategy to gain new high-value industries rather than merely protect existing ones, by helping America’s industrial commons stay healthy enough to attract innovation. Doubters need only look to the advanced technology industries that sprung out of the Asian Tiger economies behind high tariffs and export promotion. Indeed, there is evidence that lowering tariffs on intermediate inputs actually berkurang firm-level innovation because firms can purchase someone else’s technology instead of developing it internally. In some sectors, that’s efficient, but in others, dependence on someone else’s technology is a grave threat.

The industrial commons supporting our defense-industry supply chains are in dire straits. A 2018 Pentagon report identified dozens of militarily significant inputs with at most two, and in some cases zero, domestic suppliers, each of which functions as a choke point for our defense capacity. These include key inputs for satellites and missiles, casting for submarines, fasteners, high-voltage cables, flares, valves, fittings for ships, circuit boards, batteries, night-vision systems, sensors, and specialty chemicals. China is the sole supplier for many of these goods. Offshoring our ability to manufacture ships, satellites, and armaments not only renders us dependent on international supply chains that might not be there in an emergency, but it also hamstrings our ability to innovate and maintain our competitive edge.

When steel tariffs were announced in March 2018, the commentariat agreed almost unanimously that higher steel prices would weaken U.S. industry, including the defense sector, by raising input costs. Yet only one year later, U.S. steel prices had dropped back down to their pre-tariff level as steelmakers added capacity, and dire predictions failed to materialize. Protests that we already made enough steel to meet defense needs missed the point: By allowing the steel industry to continue to produce its full product range and remain profitable in the face of the Chinese supply glut, the tariffs may have arrested Pisano and Shih’s know-how cascade and safeguarded long-term viability.

But steel is only one part of the puzzle, because U.S.–China trade competition is increasingly about who will own the technologies that shape the future. Tariffs should be aimed at winning what is essentially a zero-sum competition for global market share in strategic sectors such as 5G telecom, advanced semiconductors, biotechnology, new materials, and aerospace. The free market is agnostic on American leadership of defense-critical industries Americans should not be. If American capital wants to speed the rise of an adversary, at the very minimum, it should pay a tariff that internalizes the national-security costs of doing so.

Social Dumping
Economists are trained to identify solutions that improve aggregate welfare. But as the economist Dani Rodrik points out, taking $100 away from Peter and giving $200 to Paul improves aggregate welfare and yet will leave half of this two-person society fuming. If net improvements occur through redistributions that people regard as illegitimate or rigged, it’s cold comfort to insist that society as a whole is better off.

Free trade makes society richer but involves major wealth redistributions between winners and losers. The international trading system has “level playing field” rules to ensure that the redistributions are accepted as legitimate. For example, the World Trade Organization allows states to place tariffs on imports that were subsidized by their home state, or were “dumped” on a trade partner for less than the cost of production.

But subsidies and dumping aren’t the only way to break the rules and make your goods cheaper than your competitor’s. You could be willing to fill your supply chains with slave labor. You could be willing to violate even your “free” workers’ rights by banning independent labor unions. You could ignore basic health-and-safety regulations, and you could be willing to despoil the environment. You could also be willing to evade even those international trading rules that do attempt to enforce a level playing field, by hiding subsidies as low interest loans from Party-connected banks and foiling WTO dumping calculations by exporting certain goods at artificially high prices so it all averages out.

When a competitor cheapens its goods by ignoring its legal obligations and violating its citizens’ rights, it’s called social dumping, and it’s just as illegitimate to ask workers to compete with socially dumped goods as with conventionally dumped goods. The competitor’s policy choice distorts the domestic bargain that workers struck in their own country, by forcing them either to abandon that bargain — for civilized labor standards, for breathable air, for safe products — or lose their jobs. If you think it’s illegitimate to ask an American worker to compete in a market with state-subsidized goods, it makes no difference whether that subsidy comes from a government check or the government’s suppression of collective bargaining. Tariffs are justified against such goods to preserve each society’s autonomous right to its own social contract.

This exposes the mistaken view that tariffs are merely a tool for government to unfairly pick winners and losers. When the global trading system includes rule breakers, free trade with that rule breaker means letting their artificially cheap goods into your market, where they will distort prices and put your firms out of business. Some on the right believe that if our trading partners want to use their taxpayers’ money to subsidize exports, American consumers should happily accept the philanthropy: cheaper inputs and cheaper prices. But Americans will remain competitive only in those industries that its trading partners have chosen not to subsidize, so the decision to avoid tariffs results in the Chinese Communist Party picking our winners and losers for us.

The bottom line is this: Trade imbalances harm us, and they are caused by competitors breaking the rules of the international trading system to create unreciprocal advantages. These include subsidies and dumping but also currency manipulation, forced technology transfer, inadequate or selective regulatory enforcement, IP theft, and intentional supply gluts. Ending this rule-breaking would require the U.S. to either find a governance mechanism that could force China to change its domestic system — none currently exists — or take enforcement action. That’s what Lighthizer’s USTR office did when it investigated which Chinese exports benefited from rule-breaking and imposed 25 percent tariffs to offset their unfair advantage.

Some say that this tit-for-tat escalation, fueling higher costs and greater uncertainty, is the single greatest drawback of tariffs. These fears often follow a naïve pattern of observing some unfair competitive act but cautioning against a response lest it invite “retaliation” — ignoring that the fight is already upon us. Complaints that China tariffs raise prices on American consumers are really complaints about losing a foreign subsidy, paid for by frittering away America’s long-term productive capacity. And certainty that this fundamentally unfair system will continue is not the kind of certainty our trade policy should protect. We can either grit our teeth and make our competitors feel that there are consequences for breaking the rules — or we can continue to be the mark.


The Dutch Economy in the Golden Age (16th – 17th Centuries)

In just over one hundred years, the provinces of the Northern Netherlands went from relative obscurity as the poor cousins of the industrious and heavily urbanized Southern Netherlands provinces of Flanders and Brabant to the pinnacle of European commercial success. Taking advantage of a favorable agricultural base, the Dutch achieved success in the fishing industry and the Baltic and North Sea carrying trade during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries before establishing a far-flung maritime empire in the seventeenth century.

The Economy of the Netherlands up to the Sixteenth Century

In many respects the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic inherited the economic successes of the Burgundian and Habsburg Netherlands. For centuries, Flanders and to a lesser extent Brabant had been at the forefront of the medieval European economy. An indigenous cloth industry was present throughout all areas of Europe in the early medieval period, but Flanders was the first to develop the industry with great intensity. A tradition of cloth manufacture in the Low Countries existed from antiquity when the Celts and then the Franks continued an active textile industry learned from the Romans.

As demand grew early textile production moved from its rural origins to the cities and had become, by the twelfth century, an essentially urban industry. Native wool could not keep up with demand, and the Flemings imported English wool in great quantities. The resulting high quality product was much in demand all over Europe, from Novgorod to the Mediterranean. Brabant also rose to an important position in textile industry, but only about a century after Flanders. By the thirteenth century the number of people engaged in some aspect of the textile industry in the Southern Netherlands had become more than the total engaged in all other crafts. It is possible that this emphasis on cloth manufacture was the reason that the Flemish towns ignored the emerging maritime shipping industry which was eventually dominated by others, first the German Hanseatic League, and later Holland and Zeeland.

By the end of the fifteenth century Antwerp in Brabant had become the commercial capital of the Low Countries as foreign merchants went to the city in great numbers in search of the high-value products offered at the city’s fairs. But the traditional cloths manufactured in Flanders had lost their allure for most European markets, particularly as the English began exporting high quality cloths rather than the raw materials the Flemish textile industry depended on. Many textile producers turned to the lighter weight and cheaper “new draperies.” Despite protectionist measures instituted in the mid-fifteenth century, English cloth found an outlet in Antwerp ‘s burgeoning markets. By the early years of the sixteenth century the Portuguese began using Antwerp as an outlet for their Asian pepper and spice imports, and the Germans continued to bring their metal products (copper and silver) there. For almost a hundred years Antwerp remained the commercial capital of northern Europe, until the religious and political events of the 1560s and 1570s intervened and the Dutch Revolt against Spanish rule toppled the commercial dominance of Antwerp and the southern provinces. Within just a few years of the Fall of Antwerp (1585), scores of merchants and mostly Calvinist craftsmen fled the south for the relative security of the Northern Netherlands.

The exodus from the south certainly added to the already growing population of the north. However, much like Flanders and Brabant, the northern provinces of Holland and Zeeland were already populous and heavily urbanized. The population of these maritime provinces had been steadily growing throughout the sixteenth century, perhaps tripling between the first years of the sixteenth century to about 1650. The inland provinces grew much more slowly during the same period. Not until the eighteenth century, when the Netherlands as a whole faced declining fortunes would the inland provinces begin to match the growth of the coastal core of the country.

Dutch Agriculture

During the fifteenth century, and most of the sixteenth century, the Northern Netherlands provinces were predominantly rural compared to the urbanized southern provinces. Agriculture and fishing formed the basis for the Dutch economy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. One of the characteristics of Dutch agriculture during this period was its emphasis on intensive animal husbandry. Dutch cattle were exceptionally well cared for and dairy produce formed a significant segment of the agricultural sector. During the seventeenth century, as the Dutch urban population saw dramatic growth many farmers also turned to market gardening to supply the cities with vegetables.

Some of the impetus for animal production came from the trade in slaughter cattle from Denmark and Northern Germany. Holland was an ideal area for cattle feeding and fattening before eventual slaughter and export to the cities of the Southern provinces. The trade in slaughter cattle expanded from about 1500 to 1660, but protectionist measures on the part of Dutch authorities who wanted to encourage the fattening of home-bred cattle ensured a contraction of the international cattle trade between 1660 and 1750.

Although agriculture made up the largest segment of the Dutch economy, cereal production in the Netherlands could not keep up with demand particularly by the seventeenth century as migration from the southern provinces contributed to population increases. The provinces of the Low Countries traditionally had depended on imported grain from the south (France and the Walloon provinces) and when crop failures interrupted the flow of grain from the south, the Dutch began to import grain from the Baltic. Baltic grain imports experienced sustained growth from about the middle of the sixteenth century to roughly 1650 when depression and stagnation characterized the grain trade into the eighteenth century.

Indeed, the Baltic grain trade (see below), a major source of employment for the Dutch, not only in maritime transport but in handling and storage as well, was characterized as the “mother trade.” In her recent book on the Baltic grain trade, Mijla van Tielhof defined “mother trade” as the oldest and most substantial trade with respect to ships, sailors and commodities for the Northern provinces. Over the long term, the Baltic grain trade gave rise to shipping and trade on other routes as well as to manufacturing industries.

Dutch Fishing

Along with agriculture, the Dutch fishing industry formed part of the economic base of the northern Netherlands. Like the Baltic grain trade, it also contributed to the rise of Dutch the shipping industry.

The backbone of the fishing industry was the North Sea herring fishery, which was quite advanced and included a form of “factory” ship called the herring bus. The herring bus was developed in the fifteenth century in order to allow the herring catch to be processed with salt at sea. This permitted the herring ship to remain at sea longer and increased the range of the herring fishery. Herring was an important export product for the Netherlands particularly to inland areas, but also to the Baltic offsetting Baltic grain imports.

The herring fishery reached its zenith in the first half of the seventeenth century. Estimates put the size of the herring fleet at roughly 500 busses and the catch at about 20,000 to 25,000 lasts (roughly 33,000 metric tons) on average each year in the first decades of the seventeenth century. The herring catch as well as the number of busses began to decline in the second half of the seventeenth century, collapsing by about the mid-eighteenth century when the catch amounted to only about 6000 lasts. This decline was likely due to competition resulting from a reinvigoration of the Baltic fishing industry that succeeded in driving prices down, as well as competition within the North Sea by the Scottish fishing industry.

The Dutch Textile Industry

The heartland for textile manufacturing had been Flanders and Brabant until the onset of the Dutch Revolt around 1568. Years of warfare continued to devastate the already beaten down Flemish cloth industry. Even the cloth producing towns of the Northern Netherlands that had been focusing on producing the “new draperies” saw their output decline as a result of wartime interruptions. But textiles remained the most important industry for the Dutch Economy.

Despite the blow it suffered during the Dutch revolt, Leiden’s textile industry, for instance, rebounded in the early seventeenth century – thanks to the influx of textile workers from the Southern Netherlands who emigrated there in the face of religious persecution. But by the 1630s Leiden had abandoned the heavy traditional wool cloths in favor of a lighter traditional woolen (laken) as well as a variety of other textiles such as says, fustians, dan camlets. Total textile production increased from 50,000 or 60,000 pieces per year in the first few years of the seventeenth century to as much as 130,000 pieces per year during the 1660s. Leiden’s wool cloth industry probably reached peak production by 1670. The city’s textile industry was successful because it found export markets for its inexpensive cloths in the Mediterranean, much to the detriment of Italian cloth producers.

Next to Lyons, Leiden may have been Europe’s largest industrial city at end of seventeenth century. Production was carried out through the “putting out” system, whereby weavers with their own looms and often with other dependent weavers working for them, obtained imported raw materials from merchants who paid the weavers by the piece for their work (the merchant retained ownership of the raw materials throughout the process). By the end of the seventeenth century foreign competition threatened the Dutch textile industry. Production in many of the new draperies (says, for example) decreased considerably throughout the eighteenth century profits suffered as prices declined in all but the most expensive textiles. This left the production of traditional woolens to drive what was left of Leiden’s textile industry in the eighteenth century.

Although Leiden certainly led the Netherlands in the production of wool cloth, it was not the only textile producing city in the United Provinces. Amsterdam, Utrecht, Delft and Haarlem, among others, had vibrant textile industries. Haarlem, for example, was home to an important linen industry during the first half of the seventeenth century. Like Leiden’s cloth industry, Haarlem’s linen industry benefited from experienced linen weavers who migrated from the Southern Netherlands during the Dutch Revolt. Haarlem’s hold on linen production, however, was due more to its success in linen bleaching and finishing. Not only was locally produced linen finished in Haarlem, but linen merchants from other areas of Europe sent their products to Haarlem for bleaching and finishing. As linen production moved to more rural areas as producers sought to decrease costs in the second half of the seventeenth century, Haarlem’s industry went into decline.

Other Dutch Industries

Industries also developed as a result of overseas colonial trade, in particular Amsterdam’s sugar refining industry. During the sixteenth century, Antwerp had been Europe’s most important sugar refining city, a title it inherited from Venice once the Atlantic sugar islands began to surpass Mediterranean sugar production. Once Antwerp fell to Spanish troops during the Revolt, however, Amsterdam replaced it as Europe’s dominant sugar refiner. The number of sugar refineries in Amsterdam increased from about 3 around 1605 to about 50 by 1662, thanks in no small part to Portuguese investment. Dutch merchants purchased huge amounts of sugar from both the French and the English islands in the West Indies, along with a great deal of tobacco. Tobacco processing became an important Amsterdam industry in the seventeenth century employing large numbers of workers and leading to attempts to develop domestic tobacco cultivation.

With the exception of some of the “colonial” industries (sugar, for instance), Dutch industry experienced a period of stagnation after the 1660s and eventual decline beginning around the turn of the eighteenth century. It would seem that as far as industrial production is concerned, the Dutch Golden Age lasted from the 1580s until about 1670. This period was followed by roughly one hundred years of declining industrial production. De Vries and van der Woude concluded that Dutch industry experienced explosive growth after 1580s because of the migration of skilled labor and merchant capital from the southern Netherlands at roughly the time Antwerp fell to the Spanish and because of the relative advantage continued warfare in the south gave to the Northern Provinces. After the 1660s most Dutch industries experienced either steady or steep decline as many Dutch industries moved from the cities into the countryside, while some (particularly the colonial industries) remained successful well into the eighteenth century.

Dutch Shipping and Overseas Commerce

Dutch shipping began to emerge as a significant sector during the fifteenth century. Probably stemming from the inaction on the part of merchants from the Southern Netherlands to participate in seaborne transport, the towns of Zeeland and Holland began to serve the shipping needs of the commercial towns of Flanders and Brabant (particularly Antwerp ). The Dutch, who were already active in the North Sea as a result of the herring fishery, began to compete with the German Hanseatic League for Baltic markets by exporting their herring catches, salt, wine, and cloth in exchange for Baltic grain.

The Grain Trade

Baltic grain played an essential role for the rapidly expanding markets in western and southern Europe. By the beginning of the sixteenth century the urban populations had increased in the Low Countries fueling the market for imported grain. Grain and other Baltic products such as tar, hemp, flax, and wood were not only destined for the Low Countries, but also England and for Spain and Portugal via Amsterdam, the port that had succeeded in surpassing Lübeck and other Hanseatic towns as the primary transshipment point for Baltic goods. The grain trade sparked the development of a variety of industries. In addition to the shipbuilding industry, which was an obvious outgrowth of overseas trade relationships, the Dutch manufactured floor tiles, roof tiles, and bricks for export to the Baltic the grain ships carried them as ballast on return voyages to the Baltic.

The importance of the Baltic markets to Amsterdam, and to Dutch commerce in general can be illustrated by recalling that when the Danish closed the Sound to Dutch ships in 1542, the Dutch faced financial ruin. But by the mid-sixteenth century, the Dutch had developed such a strong presence in the Baltic that they were able to exact transit rights from Denmark (Peace of Speyer, 1544) allowing them freer access to the Baltic via Danish waters. Despite the upheaval caused by the Dutch and the commercial crisis that hit Antwerp in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, the Baltic grain trade remained robust until the last years of the seventeenth century. That the Dutch referred to the Baltic trade as their “mother trade” is not surprising given the importance Baltic markets continued to hold for Dutch commerce throughout the Golden Age. Unfortunately for Dutch commerce, Europe ‘s population began to decline somewhat at the close of the seventeenth century and remained depressed for several decades. Increased grain production in Western Europe and the availability of non-Baltic substitutes (American and Italian rice, for example) further decreased demand for Baltic grain resulting in a downturn in Amsterdam ‘s grain market.

Expansion into African, American and Asian Markets – “World Primacy”

Building on the early successes of their Baltic trade, Dutch shippers expanded their sphere of influence east into Russia and south into the Mediterranean and the Levantine markets. By the turn of the seventeenth century, Dutch merchants had their eyes on the American and Asian markets that were dominated by Iberian merchants. The ability of Dutch shippers to effectively compete with entrenched merchants, like the Hanseatic League in the Baltic, or the Portuguese in Asia stemmed from their cost cutting strategies (what de Vries and van der Woude call “cost advantages and institutional efficiencies,” p. 374). Not encumbered by the costs and protective restrictions of most merchant groups of the sixteenth century, the Dutch trimmed their costs enough to undercut the competition, and eventually establish what Jonathan Israel has called “world primacy.”

Before Dutch shippers could even attempt to break in to the Asian markets they needed to first expand their presence in the Atlantic. This was left mostly to the émigré merchants from Antwerp, who had relocated to Zeeland following the Revolt. These merchants set up the so-called Guinea trade with West Africa, and initiated Dutch involvement in the Western Hemisphere. Dutch merchants involved in the Guinea trade ignored the slave trade that was firmly in the hands of the Portuguese in favor of the rich trade in gold, ivory, and sugar from São Tomé. Trade with West Africa grew slowly, but competition was stiff. By 1599, the various Guinea companies had agreed to the formation of a cartel to regulate trade. Continued competition from a slew of new companies, however, insured that the cartel would be only partially effective until the organization of the Dutch West India Company in 1621 that also held monopoly rights in the West Africa trade.

The Dutch at first focused their trade with the Americas on the Caribbean. By the mid-1590s only a few Dutch ships each year were making the voyage across the Atlantic. When the Spanish instituted an embargo against the Dutch in 1598, shortages in products traditionally obtained in Iberia (like salt) became common. Dutch shippers seized the chance to find new sources for products that had been supplied by the Spanish and soon fleets of Dutch ships sailed to the Americas. The Spanish and Portuguese had a much larger presence in the Americas than the Dutch could mount, despite the large number vessels they sent to the area. Dutch strategy was to avoid Iberian strongholds while penetrating markets where the products they desired could be found. For the most part, this strategy meant focusing on Venezuela, Guyana, and Brazil. Indeed, by the turn of the seventeenth century, the Dutch had established forts on the coasts of Guyana and Brazil.

While competition between rival companies from the towns of Zeeland marked Dutch trade with the Americas in the first years of the seventeenth century, by the time the West India Company finally received its charter in 1621 troubles with Spain once again threatened to disrupt trade. Funding for the new joint-stock company came slowly, and oddly enough came mostly from inland towns like Leiden rather than coastal towns. The West India Company was hit with setbacks in the Americas from the very start. The Portuguese began to drive the Dutch out of Brazil in 1624 and by 1625 the Dutch were loosing their position in the Caribbean as well. Dutch shippers in the Americas soon found raiding (directed at the Spanish and Portuguese) to be their most profitable activity until the Company was able to establish forts in Brazil again in the 1630s and begin sugar cultivation. Sugar remained the most lucrative activity for the Dutch in Brazil, and once the revolt of Portuguese Catholic planters against the Dutch plantation owners broke out the late 1640s, the fortunes of the Dutch declined steadily.

The Dutch faced the prospect of stiff Portuguese competition in Asia as well. But, breaking into the lucrative Asian markets was not just a simple matter of undercutting less efficient Portuguese shippers. The Portuguese closely guarded the route around Africa. Not until roughly one hundred years after the first Portuguese voyage to Asia were the Dutch in a position to mount their own expedition. Thanks to the travelogue of Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, which was published in 1596, the Dutch gained the information they needed to make the voyage. Linschoten had been in the service of the Bishop of Goa, and kept excellent records of the voyage and his observations in Asia.

The United East India Company (VOC)

The first few Dutch voyages to Asia were not particularly successful. These early enterprises managed to make only enough to cover the costs of the voyage, but by 1600 dozens of Dutch merchant ships made the trip. This intense competition among various Dutch merchants had a destabilizing effect on prices driving the government to insist on consolidation in order to avoid commercial ruin. The United East India Company (usually referred to by its Dutch initials, VOC) received a charter from the States General in 1602 conferring upon it monopoly trading rights in Asia. This joint stock company attracted roughly 6.5 million florins in initial capitalization from over 1,800 investors, most of whom were merchants. Management of the company was vested in 17 directors (Heren XVII) chosen from among the largest shareholders.

In practice, the VOC became virtually a “country” unto itself outside of Europe, particularly after about 1620 when the company’s governor-general in Asia, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, founded Batavia (the company factory) on Java. While Coen and later governors-general set about expanding the territorial and political reach of the VOC in Asia, the Heren XVII were most concerned about profits, which they repeatedly reinvested in the company much to the chagrin of investors. In Asia, the strategy of the VOC was to insert itself into the intra-Asian trade (much like the Portuguese had done in the sixteenth century) in order to amass enough capital to pay for the spices shipped back to the Netherlands. This often meant displacing the Portuguese by waging war in Asia, while trying to maintain peaceful relations within Europe.

Over the long term, the VOC was very profitable during the seventeenth century despite the company’s reluctance to pay cash dividends in first few decades (the company paid dividends in kind until about 1644). As the English and French began to institute mercantilist strategies (for instance, the Navigation Acts of 1551 and 1660 in England, and import restrictions and high tariffs in the case of France ) Dutch dominance in foreign trade came under attack. Rather than experience a decline like domestic industry did at the end of the seventeenth century, the Dutch Asia trade continued to ship goods at steady volumes well into the eighteenth century. Dutch dominance, however, was met with stiff competition by rival India companies as the Asia trade grew. As the eighteenth century wore on, the VOC’s share of the Asia trade declined significantly compared to its rivals, the most important of which was the English East India Company.

Dutch Finance

The last sector that we need to highlight is finance, perhaps the most important sector for the development of the early modern Dutch economy. The most visible manifestation of Dutch capitalism was the exchange bank founded in Amsterdam in 1609 only two years after the city council approved the construction of a bourse (additional exchange banks were founded in other Dutch commercial cities). The activities of the bank were limited to exchange and deposit banking. A lending bank, founded in Amsterdam in 1614, rounded out the financial services in the commercial capital of the Netherlands.

The ability to manage the wealth generated by trade and industry (accumulated capital) in new ways was one of the hallmarks of the economy during the Golden Age. As early as the fourteenth century, Italian merchants had been experimenting with ways to decrease the use of cash in long-distance trade. The resulting instrument was the bill of exchange developed as a way to for a seller to extend credit to a buyer. The bill of exchange required the debtor to pay the debt at a specified place and time. But the creditor rarely held on to the bill of exchange until maturity preferring to sell it or otherwise use it to pay off debts. These bills of exchange were not routinely used in commerce in the Low Countries until the sixteenth century when Antwerp was still the dominant commercial city in the region. In Antwerp the bill of exchange could be assigned to another, and eventually became a negotiable instrument with the practice of discounting the bill.

The idea of the flexibility of bills of exchange moved to the Northern Netherlands with the large numbers of Antwerp merchants who brought with them their commercial practices. In an effort to standardize the practices surrounding bills of exchange, the Amsterdam government restricted payment of bills of exchange to the new exchange bank. The bank was wildly popular with merchants deposits increasing from just less than one million guilders in 1611 to over sixteen million by 1700. Amsterdam ‘s exchange bank flourished because of its ability to handle deposits and transfers, and to settle international debts.

By the second half of the seventeenth century many wealthy merchant families had turned away from foreign trade and began engaging in speculative activities on a much larger scale. They traded in commodity values (futures), shares in joint-stock companies, and dabbled in insurance and currency exchanges to name only a few of the most important ventures.

Kesimpulannya

Building on its fifteenth- and sixteenth-century successes in agricultural productivity, and in North Sea and Baltic shipping, the Northern Netherlands inherited the economic legacy of the southern provinces as the Revolt tore the Low Countries apart. The Dutch Golden Age lasted from roughly 1580, when the Dutch proved themselves successful in their fight with the Spanish, to about 1670, when the Republic’s economy experienced a down-turn. Economic growth was very fast during until about 1620 when it slowed, but continued to grow steadily until the end of the Golden Age. The last decades of the seventeenth century were marked by declining production and loss of market dominance overseas.

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Tonton videonya: Reaction to WW1- Fordney- McCumber Act