4 September 1941

4 September 1941



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4 September 1941

September 1941

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Bahagian Depan Timur

Pasukan Finland mencapai sempadan sebelum Perang Musim Sejuk. Pendahuluan Finland berhenti pada ketika ini

Mediterranean

Serangan udara melanda Malta



Ted Williams menjadi pemain terakhir yang memukul .400

Pada 28 September 1941, Boston Red Sox & # x2019s Ted Williams bermain dengan dua tandukan menentang Philadelphia Athletics pada hari terakhir musim biasa dan mendapat enam hits dalam lapan perjalanan ke piring, untuk meningkatkan purata pemukulnya menjadi .406 dan menjadi pemain pertama sejak Bill Terry pada tahun 1930 yang memukul .400. Williams, yang menghabiskan seluruh kariernya dengan Sox, memainkan permainan terakhirnya tepat 19 tahun kemudian, pada 28 September 1960, di Boston & # x2019s Fenway Park dan membuat larian tuan rumah pada kali terakhir di kelelawar, dengan jumlah karier 521 homerun.

Williams dilahirkan pada 30 Ogos 1918, di San Diego, dan memulakan karier liga utamanya dengan Red Sox pada tahun 1939. 1941 menandakan Williams & # x2019 musim terbaik. Sebagai tambahan kepada rata-rata pemukul .406 & # x2013tidak ada pemain liga utama sejak dia memukul .400 & # x2013pemain kiri memimpin liga dengan 37 homers, 135 larian dan rata-rata slugging 0,735. Juga pada musim itu, Williams, yang nama panggilannya termasuk & # x201C The Splendid Splinter & # x201D dan & # x201C The Thumper, & # x201D mempunyai peratusan on-base sebanyak .553, rekod yang tetap tidak putus selama 61 tahun, sehingga Barry Bonds mencapai peratusan sebanyak .582 pada tahun 2002.

Pada tahun 1942, Williams memenangi Liga Amerika Triple Crown, dengan rata-rata pemukul tertinggi dan kebanyakan RBI dan homerun. Dia menggandakan prestasi itu pada tahun 1947. Pada tahun 1946 dan 1949, dia dinobatkan sebagai Pemain Paling Bernilai Liga Amerika dan pada bulan Jun 1960, dia menjadi pemain keempat dalam sejarah liga utama yang mencecah 500 homer. Dia terpilih ke pasukan All-Star sebanyak 17 kali.

Williams bermain permainan terakhirnya pada 28 September 1960, dan bersara dengan rata-rata pemukul seumur hidup sebanyak .344, peratusan kerjaya .483 dan peratusan sebanyak 2.654. Pencapaiannya lebih mengagumkan kerana kerjayanya terganggu dua kali untuk perkhidmatan ketenteraan: Williams adalah juruterbang Kor Marin semasa Perang Dunia II dan Perang Korea dan akibatnya ketinggalan hampir lima musim dari besbol.


4 September 1941 - Sejarah

ReSignalman Joe Moll dengan Lebih baik panji, ca. 1942.

Lebih baik, dinamakan sebagai Laksamana Muda James A. Greer (1833 & ndash1904), adalah salah satu dari 48 dek lantai yang dibina di William Cramp & amp Sons Ship & amp Engine Building Co., Philadelphia. Dia dilancarkan 1 Ogos 1918, ditugaskan pada 31 Disember dan awalnya bertugas dengan Armada Atlantik, berpindah ke Armada Pasifik pada tahun 1919 dan ke Armada Asiatik pada bulan Jun 1920.

Lebih baik dinyahaktifkan pada tahun 1937 dan ditempatkan dalam simpanan di Philadelphia Navy Yard tetapi beroperasi semula pada Oktober 1939, tidak lama selepas bermulanya Perang Dunia II di Eropah. Dia mengekalkan penampilan umum pada masa ini, tetapi pada tahun 1941 satu timbunan dikeluarkan.

Pada bulan Februari 1940 Lebih baik ditugaskan untuk Rondaan Berkecuali Atlantik Utara. Selepas pelayaran ke Laut Caribbean bermula pada bulan Oktober, dia kembali ke Atlantik Utara pada awal tahun 1941, beroperasi secara amnya antara Newfoundland dan Iceland dengan kru yang baik di bawah LCdr. H. L. Frost dan Cmdr. G. W. Johnson, ComDesDiv 61, memulakan.

Pada pukul 0750 pagi 4 September 1941, dia menghubungi sebuah pesawat Britain lima minit kemudian, pesawat itu melaporkan kapal selam. Lebih baik ditutup dan mendapat hubungan sonar. Pada 0930, pengebom menyerang sasaran dengan empat muatan kedalaman, kemudian kembali ke pangkalan.

Lebih baik terus mengesan kenalannya selama dua jam berikutnya sementara pesawat bantuan tiba. Pada 1140, dengan kapal selam di busur pelabuhannya, Lebih baik melihat dua torpedo dan berpaling ke arah mereka, berjaya mengelak. Sepuluh minit kemudian, dia menjatuhkan sepuluh muatan kedalaman di kapal selam itu tetapi kehilangan hubungan.

U-652, kapal selam Jenis VII-C Jerman, diturunkan di Hamburg pada 5 Februari 1940 dan ditugaskan pada 3 April 1941. Dalam lapan rondaan perang di Atlantik dan Mediterranean, dia menenggelamkan lima kapal termasuk kapal pemusnah Inggeris HMS Heythorp di Libya pada 20 Mac 1942.

Pada jam 1230, tidak mendapat hubungan semula, Lebih baik meneruskan kursus untuk Iceland. Seorang pemusnah Inggeris muncul dan kemudian pergi. Lima minit kemudian, Lebih baik mendapatkan kembali hubungan kapal selam dan menurunkan sembilan caj kedalaman. Kapal selam, U-652, tidak rosak.

Satu minggu kemudian, Presiden Roosevelt menerangkan ini & ldquoLebih baik kejadian & rdquo dalam alamat radio, di mana dia mengartikulasikan doktrin & ldquoshoot pada pandangan. & rdquo

Lebih baik tetap melakukan rondaan di Atlantik dan Caribbean sehingga 1944, ketika dia ditugaskan untuk tugas pesisir. Dia dinyahaktifkan di Philadelphia Julai 1945 dan dijual untuk sekerap November itu.

Sumber: Lebih baik log dek untuk 4 September 1941, perbualan dengan Lebih baik rakan kapal Joe Moll Morison, DANFS.


Pada Hari Ini: 4 September

Pada 4 September 1957, Arkansas Gov. Orval Faubus memanggil Pengawal Nasional untuk mencegah sembilan pelajar kulit hitam memasuki Central High School di Little Rock.

Pada 4 September 1908, Richard Wright, yang buku-bukunya & # 39; Anak Asli & & quot; Black Boy & quot; mendedahkan kesan keras dari perkauman Amerika, dilahirkan. Setelah kematiannya pada 28 November 1960, berita kematiannya muncul di The Times.

Pada Tarikh Ini

1781 Los Angeles ditubuhkan oleh peneroka Sepanyol.
1888 George Eastman mendapat hak paten untuk kamera filem bergulungnya dan mendaftarkan tanda dagangannya: Kodak.
1917 Pasukan ekspedisi Amerika di Perancis mengalami kematian pertama dalam Perang Dunia I.
1951 Dalam siaran TV langsung-ke-pantai langsung, Presiden Harry S. Truman menyampaikan ucapan kepada negara itu dari persidangan perjanjian damai Jepun di San Francisco.
1957 Ford Motor Co. mula menjual rangkaian Edsel yang tidak bernasib baik.
1972 Perenang Mark Spitz menjadi orang pertama yang memenangi tujuh pingat emas di Sukan Olimpik tunggal ketika Amerika Syarikat memenangi geganti 400 meter di Munich.
2002 Penyanyi Kelly Clarkson terpilih sebagai & quot; American Idol & quot; yang pertama dalam siri Fox TV.
2006 & quotCrocodile Hunter & quot; Steve Irwin, 44, meninggal dunia setelah ikan pari & barb menusuk dadanya.
2007 Pembuat mainan, Mattel Inc., menarik balik 800,000 mainan buatan China yang dicat timah di seluruh dunia, penarikan balik ketiga yang besar hanya dalam sebulan.
2008 Senator John McCain menerima pencalonan presiden Republik di pesta & konvensyen di St Paul, Minn.
2008 Walikota Detroit Kwame Kilpatrick mengaku bersalah kerana menghalang keadilan dalam skandal seks, memaksa Demokrat keluar dari pejabat.

Hari Lahir Bersejarah

Richard Wright 9/4/1908 - 11/28/1960 Novelis Amerika dan penulis cerpen. Pergi ke obituari & # xBB
79 Francois Chateaubriand 9/4/1768 - 7/4/1848
Pengarang dan diplomat Perancis
72 Anton Bruckner 9/4/1824 - 10/11/1896
Komposer, organis dan guru Austria
65 Daniel Burnham 9/4/1846 - 6/1/1912
Arkitek Amerika dan perancang bandar
75 John Dillon 9/4/1851 - 8/4/1927
Pemimpin Parti Nasionalis Ireland
78 Simon Lake 9/4/1866 - 6/23/1945
Pencipta Amerika membina kapal selam & quotArgonaut & quot
45 La Argentina 9/4/1890 - 7/18/1936
Penari Sepanyol
78 Mary Renault 9/4/1905 - 12/13/1983
Novelis Afrika Selatan kelahiran Inggeris
90 Edward Dmytryk 9/4/1908 - 7/1/1999
Pengarah filem Amerika salah satu & quotHollywood Ten & quot
70 Henry Ford II 9/4/1917 - 9/29/1987
Ketua perindustrian Amerika Ford Motor Co. (1945-79)

Buletin Mingguan

Daftar untuk mendapatkan buletin percuma kami. Dapatkan rancangan pelajaran, pertandingan dan sumber pelajaran terkini untuk mengajar dengan The Times.


Anda dilahirkan di sebuah Sabtu

20 September 1941 adalah hari Sabtu ke-38 tahun itu. Ia juga merupakan hari ke-263 dan bulan ke-9 1941 dalam kalendar Georgia. Kali berikutnya anda boleh menggunakan semula kalendar 1941 pada tahun 2025. Kedua-dua kalendar akan sama.

Ada yang tersisa sebelum ulang tahun anda yang seterusnya. Ulang tahun ke-80 anda akan diadakan pada hari Ahad dan hari jadi selepas itu pada hari Selasa. Pemasa di bawah adalah jam undur untuk ulang tahun anda yang seterusnya. Ia sentiasa tepat dan dikemas kini secara automatik.

Hari lahir anda yang seterusnya adalah pada hari Ahad


Stalin Bergerak Menentang & # 8216Volga Jerman & # 8217

Dari Militan, Vol. V No. 38, 20 September 1941, hlm & # 1606.
Diterjemahkan & ditandakan oleh Einde O & # 8217Callaghan untuk Ensiklopedia Trotskyisme Dalam Talian (ETOL).

Pada 8 September, Kremlin akhirnya mengumumkan teks ukase yang mengasingkan warga Soviet beramai-ramai ke Siberia kerana keturunan mereka! Ukase besar ini berbunyi:

& # 8220 PRAESIDI MAJLIS SUPREME USSR TELAH MENEMUKANNYA TIDAK DIPERLUKAN UNTUK MENYELESAIKAN SEMUA PENDUDUK JERAWAT DAERAH VOLGA KE DAERAH LAIN. & # 8221 (N.Y. Times, 8 September)

Semasa perang dunia pertama, Czar Nicholas berdarah menggunakan langkah-langkah penindasan terhadap rakyat kelahiran Jerman. Menjelang akhir tahun 1916, rejim Czarist, yang memancarkan kebencian antara kaum, memulakan persiapan untuk mengasingkan semua orang Volga Jerman ke Siberia. Tarikh yang ditetapkan untuk pengusiran besar-besaran ini adalah April 1917. Inilah cara rasmi Stalin & # 8217s Ensiklopedia Soviet, menyimpulkan nasib ukase Czarist:

& # 8220Penyingkiran autokrasi menghalang pelaksanaan tindakan biadab ini. Ketika penjajah menggesa Pemerintah Sementara untuk mencabut undang-undang ini, Kerensky hanya bersetuju untuk & # 8216menghentikan pelaksanaan ukase ini. & # 8217 ukase ini dimansuhkan hanya oleh Revolusi Sosialis Oktober Besar yang mengakhiri penindasan nasional dan yang dibuka jalan raya yang luas untuk pengembangan budaya nasional, sosialis dalam kandungan dan kebangsaan dalam bentuk & # 8221 (Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia, jilid & # 16041, hlm. & # 160595, Moscow 1939).

Garis-garis ini dicetak dua tahun lalu pada tahun 1939 & # 8211 tahun perjanjian Stalin-Hitler. Sekarang Stalin mengingatkan orang Volga Jerman bahawa Czar telah menemui emulator.
 

Latar belakang Volga Jerman

Penempatan Jerman di Volga bermula pada pertengahan abad kelapan belas ketika Catherine the Great mengundang orang asing untuk menetap di sana. Jauh di pedalaman negara ini, wilayah seluas 28.000 kilometer persegi, sekarang bersempadan dengan Saratov dan Stalingrad oblast (kawasan), lebih jauh dikeluarkan hari ini dari arena operasi ketenteraan daripada yang berlaku pada zaman Czar Nicholas. Peneroka asal kebanyakan datang & # 8211 antara 1764 dan 1864 & # 8211 dari Westphalia, Bavaria, Saxony, Swabia, Alsace-Lorraine dan Switzerland. Keistimewaan yang awalnya diberikan secara beransur-ansur dihilangkan. Semasa pecahnya pembunuhan imperialis pertama, status mereka adalah kewarganegaraan yang ditindas dalam apa yang disebut oleh Lenin & # 8220 penjara penjara bangsa-bangsa. & # 8221 Revolusi Oktober membebaskan mereka.

Orang-orang Volga Jerman adalah antara yang pertama diberi autonomi dalam persekutuan republik-republik Soviet. Pada 19 Oktober 1918, Lenin menandatangani keputusan yang menetapkan autonomi wilayah (kawasan) orang Volga Jerman. Stalin ketika itu adalah Komisar Nasional. Artikel yang dipetik di atas di Ensiklopedia Soviet tidak gagal menggarisbawahi bahawa:

& # 8220 Komrad Stalin sejak awal memberi perhatian besar kepada persoalan penentuan nasib sendiri orang-orang Volga Jerman. & # 8221

Keturunan penjajah asal ini terus berjuang menentang Pengawal Putih. Sejauh mana penyertaan mereka dalam Perang Saudara dapat diukur dengan fakta bahawa pada tahun terakhir Perang Saudara, jumlah penduduk di daerah ini menurun dari 453,000 pada tahun 1920 menjadi kurang dari 350,000 pada tahun 1921, yaitu, kerugian lebih dari 20 orang peratus. Pada tahun 1926, Republik Sosialis Jerman Autonomous ditubuhkan secara rasmi.

Menurut angka rasmi tahun 1936, populasi wilayah ini berjumlah sekitar 500,000 di antaranya sedikit kurang dari dua pertiga (66,4 persen) berasal dari Jerman 20,4 persen, Rusia dan 12 persen dari Ukraine. Hari ini, tidak ada lebih dari 300,000 penduduk kelahiran Jerman di wilayah ini yang kemajuannya menjadi salah satu kebanggaan rejim Stalin & # 8217.
 

Apa Kata Stalinis Semalam

Petani Volga kelahiran Jerman baru-baru ini disambut sebagai model pertanian kolektif. Kisah kejayaan Stalinist pertanian mekanik di daerah ini akan memenuhi seluruh perpustakaan. Cukuplah untuk mengutip panegirik stereotaip dengan mana artikel di Ensiklopedia Soviet menyimpulkan:

& # 8220Perkembangan lebih lanjut ekonomi nasional dan budaya Republik Sosialis Autonomi Jerman Volga dan kemajuannya yang pesat ke kehidupan yang lebih baik dan lebih bahagia dijamin oleh Perlembagaan Stalinis, oleh kepimpinan Stalinis yang tegas dari Jawatankuasa Pusat Parti Komunis Kesatuan Soviet dan oleh pengabdian yang tidak terbatas dari para pekerja Republik Sosialis Jerman Autonomous Volga kepada penyebab komunisme. & # 8221

Pada tahun 1941, Republik Autonomi ini dihapuskan sebagai bahaya bagi negara. Apa pengakuan muflis!

Hari ini Stalin melanggar Artikel 13 sendiri & # 8220Perlembagaan & # 8221 yang & # 8220 menjamin & # 8221 hak-hak minoriti nasional. Kenapa? Penjelasan rasmi berbunyi:

& # 8220Menurut maklumat yang boleh dipercayai yang diterima oleh pihak berkuasa tentera, ribuan dan puluhan ribu penyelam dan mata-mata di kalangan penduduk Volga Jerman bersedia untuk membuat letupan di wilayah-wilayah ini atas isyarat dari Jerman. & # 8221 (N.Y. Times, 8 September)

Marilah kita mengabulkan bahawa Kremlin, bertentangan dengan kebiasaannya, kali ini mengatakan yang sebenarnya. Mungkinkah ada kecaman yang lebih besar terhadap rejim Stalin & # 8217 daripada pengakuan ini bahawa setelah semua & # 8220 kejayaan & # 8221 masih ada ribuan, bahkan, puluhan ribu yang hanya menunggu isyarat dari Nazi untuk menentang kuasa Soviet? Mengapa kesetiaan ribuan ini boleh terpengaruh dengan mudah? Apa bahan propaganda yang lebih baik yang diharapkan oleh Hitler daripada yang sekarang disediakan oleh Kremlin kepadanya?

Dan ukase ini mendapat jaminan dari semua pelacur pena Stalin yang darahnya dibersihkan dan pelindungnya telah & # 8220 mencabut musuh-musuh rakyat. & # 8221
 

Pengakuan GPU

The Masa penghantaran yang berkaitan dengan ukase terhadap Volga German mengandungi komen berikut, yang disahkan oleh penapis Kremlin:

& # 8220Tidak ada orang Jerman dari Volga yang melaporkan kewujudan sejumlah besar pembangkang yang telah ditemui. & # 8221

Pernyataan ringkas ini sama seperti penyataan formula Kremlin mengenai & # 8220diversionists & # 8221 dan & # 8220spies. & # 8221

Di sini kita mempunyai pengakuan rasmi bahawa G.P.U. menemui & # 8220disiden & # 8221 dalam jumlah besar. Dalam bahasa Kremlin setiap pembangkang, setiap orang yang mengkritik Stalin adalah & # 8220diversionis dan perisik. & # 8221 Hari ini mereka ditemui di wilayah Volga. Dan esok?

The ukase 28 Ogos merupakan & # 8220peringatan & # 8221 kepada semua pembangkang bahawa mereka akan menanggung nasib rakyat Volga Jerman. Sehingga kini, setiap pembangkang di mana sahaja & # 8220diketahui & # 8221 akan dihubungkan secara rasmi dengan & # 8220penyokong dan pengintip. & # 8221 Dengan pengusiran besar-besaran ke Siberia dari kambing-kambing Volga kelahiran Jerman ini, Stalin berusaha untuk membangkitkan kebencian antara kaum dan dengan ini sebagai penutup untuk menyediakan tanah untuk pembersihan jisim serupa di kawasan lain.

Tetapi pada masa yang sama, yang terbaru ukase Kremlin mengungkapkan bahawa penentangan terhadap rejim birokrasi semakin meningkat di kalangan penduduk. Massa Soviet secara mempertahankan diri dari Kesatuan Soviet. Mereka tidak memperjuangkan kekekalan birokrat.


4 September 1941 - Sejarah

Persidangan di Kremlin pada 30 Julai 1941, 6:30 hingga 8:30 malam, di antara Harry L. Hopkins dan Mr. Stalin

Turut hadir ialah Duta Besar Steinhardt dan Encik Reinhardt, 53 orang Jurubahasa Amerika

Saya memberitahu Encik Stalin bahawa saya datang sebagai wakil peribadi Presiden. Presiden menganggap Hitler sebagai musuh umat manusia dan oleh itu dia ingin membantu Soviet Union dalam memerangi Jerman.

Saya memberitahunya bahawa misi saya bukanlah diplomatik dalam arti bahawa saya tidak mencadangkan pemahaman formal mengenai jenis atau watak apa pun.

Saya menyatakan kepadanya kepercayaan Presiden bahawa perkara paling penting yang harus dilakukan di dunia hari ini adalah mengalahkan Hitler dan Hitlerism. [Halaman 803] Saya mengagumkan kepadanya tekad Presiden dan Pemerintah kita untuk menghulurkan segala bantuan kepada Kesatuan Soviet seawal mungkin.

Saya memberitahu Stalin bahawa saya mempunyai pesanan peribadi tertentu dari Presiden 54 dan menjelaskan hubungan saya dengan Pentadbiran di Washington. Saya memberitahunya lebih jauh bahawa saya baru sahaja meninggalkan Mr. Churchill di London yang ingin saya menyampaikan kepadanya sentimen yang telah saya nyatakan dari Presiden.

Stalin mengatakan bahawa dia menyambut saya di Kesatuan Soviet bahawa dia sudah diberitahu mengenai lawatan saya.

Menggambarkan Hitler dan Jerman, Stalin berbicara tentang perlunya ada standard moral minimum antara semua bangsa dan tanpa standard moral minimum negara-negara tidak dapat hidup bersama. Dia menyatakan bahawa para pemimpin Jerman sekarang tidak mengetahui standard moral minimum seperti itu dan oleh itu, mereka mewakili kekuatan anti-sosial di dunia sekarang. Orang Jerman adalah rakyat, katanya, yang tanpa berfikir sedetik akan menandatangani perjanjian hari ini, memutuskannya esok dan menandatangani perjanjian kedua pada hari berikutnya. Negara harus memenuhi kewajiban perjanjian mereka, katanya, atau masyarakat internasional tidak dapat wujud.

Ketika dia menyelesaikan ringkasan umum mengenai sikap Uni Soviet terhadap Jerman, dia berkata "oleh itu pandangan kami bertepatan".

Saya memberitahu Stalin bahawa persoalan mengenai bantuan kepada Kesatuan Soviet terbahagi kepada dua bahagian. Pertama, apa yang paling dikehendaki oleh Rusia agar Amerika Syarikat dapat segera melaksanakannya dan, kedua, apakah kehendak Rusia berdasarkan perang yang panjang?

Stalin tersenarai dalam kategori pertama keperluan segera, pertama, senjata antipesawat berkaliber sederhana, dari 20 hingga 37 mm., Bersama dengan peluru. Dia menyatakan bahawa dia memerlukan senapan berkaliber sederhana seperti kerana kepantasan api dan pergerakan mereka. Dia menyatakan bahawa secara keseluruhan dia memerlukan kira-kira 20,000 kepingan artileri anti-pesawat, besar dan kecil. Dia percaya bahawa jika dia dapat memperoleh jumlah tersebut, ia akan segera melepaskan hampir 2.000 kapal pengejar yang saat ini diperlukan untuk melindungi tujuan ketenteraan di belakang garis Soviet dan pesawat seperti itu, jika dibebaskan, dapat digunakan sebagai kekuatan menyerang musuh.

  • Kedua, dia meminta senapang berukuran besar untuk mempertahankan kota-kota.
  • Ketiga, dia mengatakan dia mendengar ada banyak senapang yang ada di Amerika Syarikat dan dia percaya kaliber mereka sesuai dengan kaliber yang digunakan di Tentera Daratnya. Dia menyatakan bahawa dia memerlukan satu juta atau lebih senapang seperti itu. Saya bertanya kepada Tuan Stalin jika dia memerlukan peluru untuk senapang ini dan dia menjawab bahawa jika kalibernya sama dengan yang digunakan oleh Tentera Merah "kita mempunyai banyak".

Dalam kategori kedua, iaitu, persediaan yang diperlukan untuk perang jarak jauh, dia menyebutkan petrol penerbangan oktan tinggi pertama, kedua, aluminium untuk pembinaan kapal terbang dan, ketiga, barang-barang lain yang telah disebutkan dalam senarai yang disampaikan kepada Pemerintah kita di Washington .

Pada titik ini dalam perbincangan, Mr. Stalin tiba-tiba membuat pernyataan, "Beri kami senjata anti-pesawat dan aluminium dan kami dapat berjuang selama tiga atau empat tahun."

Saya merujuk pada 200 Curtiss P – 40 yang dihantar ke Kesatuan Soviet dan, sebagai jawapan kepada soalan dari Stalin, saya mengesahkan fakta bahawa 140 dihantar melalui England dan 60 dari Amerika Syarikat.

Berkaitan dengan penghantaran pesawat ini, saya merujuk kepada kehadiran Letnan Alison di Moscow dan mengatakan bahawa dia adalah pakar yang luar biasa dalam operasi pesawat jenis ini. Saya bertanya adakah dia ingin menempatkan Letnan Alison di Archangel sebagai penasihat, yang dijawab oleh Mr. Stalin dengan tegas.

Stalin menyatakan bahawa dia akan senang sekiranya kami menghantar juruteknik yang kami dapat ke Uni Soviet untuk membantu melatih para pejuangnya sendiri dalam penggunaan pesawat ini. Dia menyatakan bahawa kapal terbangnya sendiri akan menunjukkan kepada kami segala-galanya mengenai peralatan Rusia, yang mana dia menyatakan bahawa kami akan merasa sangat menarik.

Dia menjelaskan secara panjang lebar, tetapi tidak secara terperinci seperti yang dia lakukan dalam persidangan pada keesokan harinya, pesawat-pesawat yang dia ada. Stalin mengatakan pesawat yang sangat diperlukannya adalah pesawat pengebom jarak pendek, yang mampu beroperasi dalam radius 600 hingga 1100 kilometer, atau dengan jarak keseluruhan 1200 hingga 2200 kilometer.

Saya bertanya kepada Stalin apa yang difikirkannya sebagai jalan terbaik untuk menghantar bekalan dari Amerika Syarikat ke Kesatuan Soviet. Stalin menyatakan bahawa laluan Teluk Parsi-Iran tidak bagus kerana keupayaan kereta api dan lebuh raya Iran yang terhad. Dia menyatakan "Selanjutnya kita belum mengetahui pandangan Pemerintah Iran mengenai hal ini."

Stalin menyatakan bahawa laluan Vladivostok bukanlah jalan yang baik. Saya menekankan bahaya ia dipotong oleh orang Jepun dan Encik Stalin seterusnya menekankan jarak yang jauh dari tempat pertempuran.

Stalin percaya bahawa laluan Archangel mungkin yang paling praktikal. Stalin dan Molotov menyatakan bahawa pelabuhan Archangel dapat dibuka pada musim sejuk dengan bantuan pemecah ais. Stalin menunjukkan bahawa satu-satunya dua pelabuhan bebas ais di utara adalah Murmansk dan Kandalaksha.

Saya memberitahu Encik Stalin bahawa penginapan saya di Moscow mesti singkat. Saya ingin mencapai sebanyak mungkin dalam masa yang singkat yang saya miliki. Saya bertanya kepada Stalin sama ada dia ingin meneruskan perbualan secara peribadi atau lebih suka saya membincangkan beberapa perincian dengan wakil Kerajaan Soviet yang lain. Saya mengatakan bahawa, tentu saja, saya lebih suka berunding dengan dia tetapi saya menyedari bahawa dia mempunyai banyak tanggungjawab ketika ini. Saya memberitahunya bahawa saya mempunyai beberapa pesanan peribadi dari Presiden yang ingin saya sampaikan pada waktu yang sesuai.

Stalin menjawab, "Anda adalah tamu kami yang Anda miliki tetapi tidak memerintahkan." Dia memberitahu saya bahawa dia akan berada di tempat saya setiap hari dari pukul enam hingga tujuh. Kemudian disepakati bahawa saya berunding dengan perwakilan Tentera Merah pada pukul 10 malam itu.

Saya mengulangi kepada Encik Stalin penghargaan kepada rakyat Amerika Syarikat atas tentangan hebat Tentera Soviet dan tekad Presiden untuk melakukan segala-galanya untuk membantu Kesatuan Soviet dalam perjuangannya yang gagah berani melawan penjajah Jerman.

Stalin membalas dengan ucapan terima kasih Kerajaan Soviet.

Saya memberitahu Stalin bahawa saya dijangka akan menemuramah wakil-wakil akhbar Anglo-Amerika setelah pertemuan saya dan bertanya sama ada Encik Stalin mempunyai hasrat berkaitan dengan apa yang harus saya katakan atau adakah dia lebih suka bahawa tidak ada wawancara sama sekali. Saya memberitahunya bahawa dalam keadaan apa pun, kisah wartawan akan terkawal dari penapisannya.

Tuan Stalin menjawab bahawa apa sahaja yang mungkin saya katakan tidak memerlukan penapisan oleh Kerajaannya.

Saya menyatakan kepada Encik Molotov keinginan saya untuk memanggilnya dan diatur agar saya berjumpa dengan Encik Molotov pada jam tiga keesokan harinya.


Berita Southwestern (Houston, Tex.), Vol. 4, No. 39, Ed. 1 Jumaat, 19 September 1941

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Re: Soviet berundur dari Kiev pada awal September 1941

Hantar oleh sejarahgeek2021 & raquo 03 Apr 2021, 02:31

Anda membaca carta di halaman 1012 salah, ia menyatakan rata-rata 21 hari untuk pulih dari penyakit pada tahun 1941. Tuntutan di hlm.1014 merujuk kepada orang sakit dari keseluruhan tempoh September 1941-Ogos 1942, tetapi carta mengatakan orang sakit pada tahun 1942 pulih secara purata setelah 40 hari. Oleh itu, 49% dalam masa 1 bulan pulih kebanyakannya merujuk kepada orang yang sakit pada tahun 1942 dan bukan pada tahun 1941. Saya meneka bahawa majoriti mereka pada tahun 1941 yang sakit untuk jangka masa yang panjang adalah kes radang dingin pada musim sejuk 1941-42, jadi kebanyakan mereka selepas tempoh yang kita bincangkan.

Carta di halaman 1020 secara khusus mengatakan hanya 56.800 pelepasan kerana penyakit itu, jadi sebahagian besarnya tinggal dan jika waktu pemulihan rata-rata untuk tahun 1941 adalah 21 hari, maka sekurang-kurangnya 50% pulih dalam 21 hari dan mungkin sekurang-kurangnya 2 / 3rd dalam masa 30 Hanya kes penyakit yang lebih teruk yang dikeluarkan. Keletihan mungkin merupakan perkara penting bagi beberapa orang untuk berhenti bertindak dan tidak ada petunjuk bahawa senjata pertarungan itu dipukul secara tidak proporsional. Mereka mungkin juga kurang terkena serangan kerana mengunyah korban yang mungkin jatuh sakit dan pengganti segar yang cenderung tidak sakit mengisi slot mereka.

Kesalahan anda sepertinya telah diambil setiap keberangkatan untuk bulan Julai 1941 dan menggandakan dengan 1.75 dan bukan hanya korban yang disebabkan oleh senjata (yang tidak termasuk hilang, jadi hapus dari pengiraan anda). Oleh itu, anda telah menggandakan jumlah orang yang dipindahkan dan ditambahkan dalam kategori lain yang seharusnya tidak termasuk.

Jadi ya, pada dasarnya apa yang saya fikirkan, anda salah membaca sumber anda sendiri.

Untuk mendapatkan jumlah orang yang sakit, saya mengalikan dengan 1.75 dengan jumlah keberangkatan, dan mencapai lebih dari 300.000. Anda betul bahawa saya sepatutnya dikalikan dengan jumlah yang cedera (kira-kira 125,000 dari apa yang dapat saya lihat dalam edisi Kindle yang kabur, saya tidak mempunyai salinan cetak pada saya atm). Mengalikan 125,000 dengan 1,75 memberi kita 218,750 askar yang sakit pada waktu tertentu pada bulan Julai (dan mungkin jumlah yang serupa pada bulan Ogos). Walaupun tempoh penyakit hanya rata-rata 21 hari, jumlahnya masih melebihi 200,000 askar pada hari tertentu. Yang bermaksud kekuatan tempur bahagian infanteri masih hanya 60%, dan kekuatan tempur dari bahagian panzer dan motor hanya 50%.

Juga dalam rangkaian ini Soviet tetap diasingkan, sehingga menjadikan tugas AG-South dan Center lebih mudah, kerana lawan-lawan mereka tetap mengejar mereka dari timur.

Tentera cadangan Soviet digerakkan terlebih dahulu di mana mereka diperlukan, iaitu Ukraine dan Leningrad mereka akan mempunyai waktu untuk digerakkan di depan Moscow jika Stalin memilih untuk mundur kerana proses mobilisasi akan dimulakan sebelum 19 Ogos ketika anda mengatakan keputusan untuk berpindah pasti telah dibuat. Kemudian mereka dapat dikerahkan di sekitar Moscow, tetapi itu adalah proses yang lebih lama dan proses yang tidak akan dianggap perlu sehingga setelah pengungsian dilakukan. Terlambat untuk mengarahkan mobilisasi untuk bulan Ogos dan kemungkinan besar bulan September memandangkan berapa banyak pengangkutan yang diperlukan untuk mengosongkan Ukraine. Sekiranya ada yang mungkin meruntuhkan proses mobilisasi ketika kereta api dialihkan untuk menyelamatkan pasukan mereka daripada membuat pasukan baru.

Disember 1941 bukan Ogos 1941. Cuba membandingkan keadaan adalah sangat tidak masuk akal. Pertempuran rumah ke rumah apa di Moscow? Selepas Vyazma tidak ada cadangan untuk memperjuangkan Moscow di bandar ini dan tidak ada lumpur untuk melambatkan Jerman. Tentera baru tidak digerakkan di kota, melaluinya.

Anda CEPAT menilai kemampuan Soviet pada bulan Ogos-September dan memandang rendah kemampuan AG-Center dalam tempoh yang sama. Kita dapat melihat apa yang berlaku kepada pasukan Soviet yang berusaha menghentikan pengepungan Leningrad dan Kiev. Petunjuk: mereka musnah.

Dalam situasi di mana Moscow disita pada bulan September (saya menganggap bahawa perarakan di Moscow akan dimulakan kemudian pada bulan Ogos) Soviet tidak mempunyai kemampuan untuk memindahkan rizab untuk menyerang Moscow, mereka akan kekurangan pusat keretapi dan talian telefon pusat mereka ( cukup penting untuk mengatur cadangan yang sukar untuk melakukannya dengan cepat dari Kubyshiev, ibu kota baru yang dirancang sekiranya pemerintah melarikan diri pada waktunya), dan mereka kekurangan industri untuk membuat senjata yang diperlukan yang melengkapkan kekuatan pada bulan Disember secara bersejarah. Sementara itu, Jerman mempunyai semua lapangan terbang Moscow, bekalan dan landasan kereta api yang ditangkap, mempunyai banjir pelarian yang melarikan diri ke timur dan memasuki infrastruktur Soviet yang tidak dapat mengatasinya, mempunyai 10% industri Soviet yang tertumpu di sekitar Moscow dan menyediakan banyak senjata dan peralatan khusus yang tidak dibuat di tempat lain, dan yang lebih penting lagi telah menghapuskan sebahagian besar kekuatan Soviet yang mungkin mengancam mereka. Satu-satunya kekuatan yang cukup besar adalah kekuatan yang melarikan diri dari Ukraine, yang masih harus berurusan dengan AG-South yang mengejar mereka. Pasukan Leningrad masih berada di Luga dan sekarang berpisah di antara juga pemeriksaan sumbu Moscow, tetapi sekarang tanpa jalur kereta api untuk memasangnya.

Garis masa dan ATLS sekali lagi menjadi keliru dalam urutan ini. Tetapi jika kita hanya berpegang pada Stolfi's ATL, di mana AGC, termasuk semua Panzer Group 2 dan Panzer Group 3, pergi ke timur pada pertengahan Ogos, maka 11 tentera Soviet baru yang digerakkan pada bulan Ogos dan 3 tentera yang digerakkan di September (semua kecuali 2 yang dikerahkan ke Leningrad dan Ukraine di OTL), akan dihantar ke teater Moscow. Sekiranya serangan AGC berjalan seperti Operasi Taufan yang dilakukan di OTL, maka ia akan mengepung 4-5 Tentera Soviet. Walaupun tidak mengira 14 tentera baru yang digerakkan pada bulan Ogos dan September, Soviet masih memiliki 5 tentera lain di rantau Moscow, ditambah pasukan Front / Briansk Front dan pasukan di Velikiye Luki yang akan memiliki tangan bebas di ATL Stolfi kerana Panzer Kumpulan 2 dan 3 tidak menyerang mereka. Sumber untuk mobilisasi tentera Soviet adalah Peta 2 di David Glantz's Barbarossa.

Tolong jelaskan bagaimana pengepungan 4-5 tentera Soviet pada akhir Ogos / awal September menyebabkan Moscow jatuh pada bulan September, memandangkan lebih dari 20 tentera lain yang akan dapat ditugaskan oleh Soviet untuk mengatasi serangan ini (sebelum 5 tentera Soviet yang lain tiba pada bulan Oktober, dan 11 lagi tiba pada bulan November-Disember)?

Juga perhatikan bahawa Army Group Center memegang bahagian depannya pada bulan Ogos dan September dengan hampir tidak ada cadangan. Lalu bagaimana mungkin memiliki tenaga untuk menahan dua / tiga sisi yang menonjol ke arah Moscow, menentang 20+ tentera Soviet? Ketika mencuba ini di OTL pada bulan Disember, ia terpaksa mundur.

Re: Soviet berundur dari Kiev pada awal September 1941

Hantar oleh KDF33 & raquo 03 Apr 2021, 03:30

1.2 juta lelaki. Kerugian tempur dan bukan pertempuran yang didaftarkan untuk bulan Jun - Ogos berjumlah 500,859, dan penggantian menjadi 215,000, termasuk 40,000 penyembuhan yang tidak dipindahkan.

Itu kerugian bersih 285,859 lelaki. Even if we assume that 100% of the casualties occurred among personnel included in the Kampfstärke, that still leaves 914,141 men - 76% of the initial figure.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Hantar oleh History Learner » 03 Apr 2021, 03:35

Saya ada. Stolfi is hardly a reputable source. The paragraph you have quoted contains no archival data on readiness. Stolfi's figure of 72% of the initial "striking power" of 2,792 operational tanks on August 13th is backed by nothing, and would require us to believe German tanks had a 74% readiness rate at the time.

How he derives his figures is anyone's guess, but it is clearly contradicted by strength reports, which, as I have shown previously, indicate far lower levels of operational readiness among long-engaged Panzer formations.

Beyond that though, using figures from September-while 3rd and 2nd Panzer were getting use by AGN and AGS-for a mid/late August estimate is a pretty bad standard. Looking at your data, you're pulling it from Panzertruppen by Jentz, which makes it all the more odd because August returns are presented for several of the divisions, but also I am not sure why you are citing them the way you are?

Case in point is 3rd Panzer, which started Barbarossa with 229 tanks and by September 4th total losses were only 70, meaning that even in September, they had a roughly 70% rate of tanks either in operation or repairable. If we take your suggestion of a few days halt, most-if not all-of those under repair would be put back in position. However, as stated, looking at September returns seems odd to me.

  • XXXIX. Armeekorps (mot.): En route to Heeresgruppe Nord, dengan 12. Panzer , begitu juga 18. and 20. Infanterie (mot.)
  • LVII. Armeekorps (mot.): 3 days away (22 August) from launching an attack on Velikiye Luki, with 19. and 20. Panzer
  • VIII. Armeekorps: Defending north-east of Smolensk, with 7. Panzer , begitu juga 14. Infanterie (mot.)
  • XXXXVI. Armeekorps (mot.): Defending south-east of Smolensk, with 10. Panzer , begitu juga Das Reich
  • XXXXVII. Armeekorps (mot.): Pushing south against 13th Army and holding the right flank of Panzergruppe 2, dengan 17. and 18. Panzer , begitu juga 29. Infanterie (mot.)
  • XXIV. Armeekorps (mot.): Pushing south against 21st Army and about to take Starodub, with 3. and 4. Panzer , begitu juga 10. Infanterie (mot.)

1. You still have produced no data on the impact of the loss of Moscow on Heeresgruppe Nord. Your assertions regarding supply are speculation.

To buttress your claim, you would need to:

1. Detail the amount of supplies needed by the northern Fronts.
2. Detail the capacity of the remaining railways.

As for Glantz, you're misconstruing his claim. The importance of Tikhvin lay in constituting the last remaining link with the USSR in general, not just with Moscow. He was also speaking of the cut off Leningrad Front. In this scenario of ours, no Soviet forces are cut off in the north.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Hantar oleh historygeek2021 » 03 Apr 2021, 04:07

1.2 million men. Registered combat and non-combat losses for June - August amounted to 500,859, and replacements to 215,000, including 40,000 non-evacuated convalescents.

That's a net loss of 285,859 men. Even if we assume that 100% of the casualties occurred among personnel included in the Kampfstärke, that still leaves 914,141 men - 76% of the initial figure.

At the end of July 1941 the German army in the east had already sustained more casualties than during the whole of the campaign in the west. By mid-September 10 per cent of the 142 divisions involved in the campaign against the Soviet Union had lost over 25 per cent of their strength of June 1941. In 28 per cent of the divisions the losses were over 20 per cent, while in another 21 per cent the losses were 12 per cent or higher. Barely half of the divisions employed had suffered casualties of less than 12 per cent. Owing to the tremendous wastage, measured according to the operational capability of men and material, the combat strength of the divisions had been reduced still further. In the second half of August it fell to 60 per cent among the infantry divisions, and to 50 per cent among the mobile troops.

Bernhard R. Kroener Rolf-Dieter Muller Hans Umbreit. Germany and the Second World War: 5 (Germany & Second World War) . OUP Oxford. Edisi Kindle.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Hantar oleh historygeek2021 » 03 Apr 2021, 04:08

I'm not misconstructing them, given I directly cited it with picture evidence so there could be no claim of me misquoting him. He directly notes the loss of the railway links with Moscow-he directly specifies Moscow, not the USSR as a whole-would be fatal.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Hantar oleh KDF33 » 03 Apr 2021, 07:38

The entire quote is this: "[Leeb] was to attack through Tikhvin to Lake Ladoga to sever Leningrad's last rail links to Moscow and completely encircle the city."

As far as he's shown, he feels this single quote validates his view that, without Moscow, the entire northern direction would collapse.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Hantar oleh stg 44 » 03 Apr 2021, 15:42

For September the chart says about 99,000 wounded. It is over 100,000 for August.
Again though remember that within the same month the majority of the sick would have recovered and returned to their units and never even left their armies only about a quarter were evacuated and they are already present in the chart.

I hate to break it to you, but your math doesn't check out for the 50 and 60% even with the sick.

As an aside I read more of Askey's book and he claims that the numbers in the chart we're discussing on p.1020 is in error and that the 509,000 arrivals in 1941 are actually just recovered wounded and sick, not replacements. He bases that claim on using the medical data in the chart on p.1012 and adding up all the sick and wounded for 1941 and using the recovery rate data he gets to about 509,000 recovered for the year with then over 545,000 replacements on top of that. I don't necessarily think he's right, but given that the DRZW uses some dubious numbers like the 50% and 60% states based on a letter sent to Halder by another officer without any context in a single throw away line in the text, maybe his argument has some merit.

Guderian drove south non-stop through August and into September. On August 8th he completed the destruction of the Soviet 28th army in his march south to Roslavl and then helped with the destruction of further Soviet forces in the Central Front on the 12th-14th during the Gomel fighting, and then continued further south. So Guderian would be driving south as of August 19th in this scenario because that is what he was already doing historically, though most of his army was still further north and it was a couple of corps that were pushing south while the rest were securing the flank and waiting for clarification from Hitler about where to go, east or south. So they could effectively turn on a dime if given the order to head east/northeast from Roslavl and the corps helping destroy Central Front could return north pretty quickly. At that point then there would be no threat to AG-Center from the south and 2nd army under von Weichs could maintain the pressure by continuing the march south as they already were.

So the pressure would be on, Central Front would be collapsing per OTL, and Guderian's forces would be able to switch to the East as soon as the order was given. And again you're completely discounting the collapsing position of SW Front on the Dniepr as a reason to get out of Ukraine. Otherwise why would Kiev be evacuated in August/early September? As to the reserve armies it seems like you completely just ignored my point about them needing to be mobilized in a specific point well in advance of their ability to become operational, so the Soviets cannot simply divert them on a dime, they'd need to select a mobilization point a month in advance and go with that, so reserve armies of August and most of September would already have their mobilization points set and changing them would disrupt the entire process and result in major delays, not least of which is due to the need to evacuate Ukraine. If they don't evacuate Ukraine though due to AG-Center attacking East then the new armies are still already set in their mobilization points unless STAVKA really wanted to introduce the disruption and delays from switching them in the process, as they'd have to then completely rework their train schedules and hope they can redirect trains already in motion plus move out units already showing up in their original mobilization sectors.

The timelines and ATLS are, again, getting confused in this thread. But if we just stick to Stolfi's ATL, in which AGC, including all of Panzer Group 2 and Panzer Group 3, drive east in the middle of August, then the 11 new Soviet armies that were mobilized in August and 3 armies that were mobilized in September (all but 2 of which were deployed to Leningrad and Ukraine in the OTL), would have been sent to the Moscow theater. If AGC's assault performs as well as Operation Typhoon did in the OTL, then it will encircle 4-5 Soviet Armies. Even not counting the 14 new armies mobilized in August and September, the Soviets still have 5 other armies in the Moscow region, plus the forces of the Central/Briansk Front and forces at Velikiye Luki that will have a free hand in Stolfi's ATL because Panzer Groups 2 and 3 aren't attacking them. Source for mobilization of Soviet armies is Map 2 in David Glantz's Barbarossa.

Please explain how the encirclement of 4-5 Soviet armies in late August/early September leads to Moscow falling in September, given the more than 20 other armies that the Soviets will be able to assign to countering this offensive (before another 5 Soviet armies arrive in October, and another 11 arrive in November-December)?

Also note that Army Group Center was holding its portion of the front in August and September with almost no reserves. How is it then going to have the manpower to hold the two/three sides of a salient protruding toward Moscow, against 20+ Soviet armies? When it tried this in the OTL in December, it was forced to retreat.

All of the 11 armies would have had their mobilization points set so couldn't shift without badly disrupting the entire mobilization process and introducing major delays while then the Fronts that were supposed to get them would be deprived of them at vital moments. I might give you the September armies being able to be diverted since there were so few of them, but then they arrive in time to be swept up in the retreat/defeat as there would be no mud to stall the Germans like in October. Soviet reserve armies did not perform well with limited time to organize after being officially mobilized sometimes even with time they didn't do well, see the Reserve Front and the militia divisions.

Unfortunately your scenario for the Soviets requires them to have a teleportation device, which seems to be why you're having a problem understanding why it was impossible for the Soviets to achieve what you're claiming. You're also forgetting that historically it wasn't just 5 armies lost to the Soviets in Typhoon, but rather 1 million men out of the 1.25 million they had defending Moscow (that's from Glantz and a Russian historian citing actual Soviet sources). Technically HQs survived, but basically without men or equipment, so they were rendered useless for a while even if still technically existing on paper. You're getting into Hitler in the Berlin Bunker in April 1945 territory moving paper armies around. Also again December 1941 is not August-September 1941.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Hantar oleh historygeek2021 » 03 Apr 2021, 18:20

For September the chart says about 99,000 wounded. It is over 100,000 for August.
Again though remember that within the same month the majority of the sick would have recovered and returned to their units and never even left their armies only about a quarter were evacuated and they are already present in the chart.

I hate to break it to you, but your math doesn't check out for the 50 and 60% even with the sick.

As an aside I read more of Askey's book and he claims that the numbers in the chart we're discussing on p.1020 is in error and that the 509,000 arrivals in 1941 are actually just recovered wounded and sick, not replacements. He bases that claim on using the medical data in the chart on p.1012 and adding up all the sick and wounded for 1941 and using the recovery rate data he gets to about 509,000 recovered for the year with then over 545,000 replacements on top of that. I don't necessarily think he's right, but given that the DRZW uses some dubious numbers like the 50% and 60% states based on a letter sent to Halder by another officer without any context in a single throw away line in the text, maybe his argument has some merit.

The conclusion that by late August 1941 the combat strength of German infantry divisions was down to 60%, and that of mobile divisions was down to 50%, is made by Bernhard R. Kroener. Kroener is a native German whose father was an officer during WW2 and later a ministerial director for the German ministry of defense. Kroener served in the German armed forces, studied military history at the Sorbonne, worked for the German Military History Research Office, taught at the University of Freiburg, published extensively, and taught from 1997 to 2013 as a professor for military history at the Historical Institute of the University of Potsdam where he held the chair in military history. From 2004 to 2010, Kroener was dean of the Philosophical Faculty, set up the “Military Studies” master’s course at the University of Potsdam, and has a long list of students who are themselves academic professors of history.

The claim that Kroener is wrong is made by Nigel Askey . a guy with a bachelors degree from the University of Sussex . who served as a consultant for a video game about the eastern front. I'll let the readers of this thread form their own judgment about who to trust.

Guderian drove south non-stop through August and into September. On August 8th he completed the destruction of the Soviet 28th army in his march south to Roslavl and then helped with the destruction of further Soviet forces in the Central Front on the 12th-14th during the Gomel fighting, and then continued further south. So Guderian would be driving south as of August 19th in this scenario because that is what he was already doing historically, though most of his army was still further north and it was a couple of corps that were pushing south while the rest were securing the flank and waiting for clarification from Hitler about where to go, east or south. So they could effectively turn on a dime if given the order to head east/northeast from Roslavl and the corps helping destroy Central Front could return north pretty quickly. At that point then there would be no threat to AG-Center from the south and 2nd army under von Weichs could maintain the pressure by continuing the march south as they already were.

So the pressure would be on, Central Front would be collapsing per OTL, and Guderian's forces would be able to switch to the East as soon as the order was given. And again you're completely discounting the collapsing position of SW Front on the Dniepr as a reason to get out of Ukraine. Otherwise why would Kiev be evacuated in August/early September? As to the reserve armies it seems like you completely just ignored my point about them needing to be mobilized in a specific point well in advance of their ability to become operational, so the Soviets cannot simply divert them on a dime, they'd need to select a mobilization point a month in advance and go with that, so reserve armies of August and most of September would already have their mobilization points set and changing them would disrupt the entire process and result in major delays, not least of which is due to the need to evacuate Ukraine. If they don't evacuate Ukraine though due to AG-Center attacking East then the new armies are still already set in their mobilization points unless STAVKA really wanted to introduce the disruption and delays from switching them in the process, as they'd have to then completely rework their train schedules and hope they can redirect trains already in motion plus move out units already showing up in their original mobilization sectors.

All of the 11 armies would have had their mobilization points set so couldn't shift without badly disrupting the entire mobilization process and introducing major delays while then the Fronts that were supposed to get them would be deprived of them at vital moments. I might give you the September armies being able to be diverted since there were so few of them, but then they arrive in time to be swept up in the retreat/defeat as there would be no mud to stall the Germans like in October. Soviet reserve armies did not perform well with limited time to organize after being officially mobilized sometimes even with time they didn't do well, see the Reserve Front and the militia divisions.

Unfortunately your scenario for the Soviets requires them to have a teleportation device, which seems to be why you're having a problem understanding why it was impossible for the Soviets to achieve what you're claiming. You're also forgetting that historically it wasn't just 5 armies lost to the Soviets in Typhoon, but rather 1 million men out of the 1.25 million they had defending Moscow (that's from Glantz and a Russian historian citing actual Soviet sources). Technically HQs survived, but basically without men or equipment, so they were rendered useless for a while even if still technically existing on paper. You're getting into Hitler in the Berlin Bunker in April 1945 territory moving paper armies around. Also again December 1941 is not August-September 1941.

Since you have dropped Stolfi's mid-August plunge for Moscow, I will focus on the ATL originally set up in this thread. According to Glantz's Barbarossa, Hitler made the decision to send Guderian's Panzer Group 2 to the Ukraine on August 18. The directive did not reach Bock at Army Group Center until August 23. Guderian returned from his personal appeal to Hitler on August 24. Meanwhile, Kirponos and the Soviet Stavka identified the growing threat to Southwestern Front's northern flank on August 18. On August 19, Soviet 5th Army was ordered to retreat across the Dnepr, while Soviet 37th Army was ordered to hold the western bank at Kiev. On August 26, Guderian's Panzer Group 2 reached Shostka and Korop, disrupting the three Soviet Armies that were deployed there to halt his advance. Guderian approached the Desna River on August 30 and crossed it on September 3.

Even if Stalin had ordered the 37th Army to retreat to the eastern bank of the Dnepr on August 18, that alone would not have caused Hitler to order Guderian to halt his advance south. Even if, as the threat from Guderian became apparent on August 26, Stalin had ordered the entire Soviet Southwestern Front to withdraw from its salient and abandon Kiev, that would not cause Hitler to change his directive for Guderian to drive south. Hitler still wanted the Ukraine for economic reasons and would have insisted on it being captured. The withdrawal of the Soviet Southwestern Front at this early date would mean that Guderian would be driving into the retreating Soviet forces as he drove south. His panzer group would have been bogged down in fighting east of Kiev for weeks, just as he was in the OTL, only this time he's not fighting encircled Red Army units who are simply trying to flee east.

So there really is no room in the ATL originally proposed in this thread for an advance on Moscow any time earlier than when it actually took place in the OTL at the start of October.


Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Hantar oleh KDF33 » 31 Mar 2021, 16:00

I have seen that. That's one of the most egregious mistakes made by Askey. The idea that the Ostheer was short by just 223,587 men at the end of the year is ludicrous, and also contradicted by German primary documents detailing the Iststärke of their armies:

June 1941: 2,765,276
July: 2,650,626
August: 2,579,879
September: 2,539,110
October: 2,381,347
November: 2,362,463
December: 2,112,002

Strength decreases by a little over 100,000 per month, which matches known casualties and replacements.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Hantar oleh stg 44 » 31 Mar 2021, 16:56

Your chart doesn't cover most of 1941 though, just December and on and is different than the one that HG posted.
The DRZW chart that historygeek posted did include wounded returned estimates them at exactly 20,000 per month every month. Askey has a larger, more complex estimate with justifications for his calculations.

It isn't simply returned wounded that came back though, but also the sick and people out for other reasons. Not only that but the Genesene AFAIK doesn't cover returned wounded who were not evacuated from the theater for longer term treatment, which only included those that took 8 weeks or more to recover (IIRC the number of weeks). So some wounded counted as casualties, but were not evacuated and only later returned, but stayed with the army for a shorter recovery before returning to their units. German casualty accounting is rather complex.

I have seen that. That's one of the most egregious mistakes made by Askey. The idea that the Ostheer was short by just 223,587 men at the end of the year is ludicrous, and also contradicted by German primary documents detailing the Iststärke of their armies:

June 1941: 2,765,276
July: 2,650,626
August: 2,579,879
September: 2,539,110
October: 2,381,347
November: 2,362,463
December: 2,112,002

Strength decreases by a little over 100,000 per month, which matches known casualties and replacements.

Iststärke (actual strength)
The Iststärke, usually written as Ist (is), was the actual number of personnel supported by the unit, regardless of their status. This included personnel on leave, lend out to other units, and those wounded or fallen sich in the past eight weeks.

The difference between the Soll and the Ist was referred to as Fehlstellen (unfilled positions), usually written as Fehl. If a unit was overstrength, it was referred to as über Soll (in excess of authorized strength). It could be possible for a unit to have one section that had unfilled positions and another that was overstrength, but the Fehl only counted the net difference.

So units in June might not have been the actual numbers on hand and later on corrected downwards.
Why the drop off in September-October given the relative dearth of fighting? 150k is a lot since there was a LOT of fighting in August to September, but only a 40k drop off.

Qvist noted something similar for 1942 in the link you provided:

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Hantar oleh historygeek2021 » 31 Mar 2021, 21:48

800,000 men out of a total of

3 million. Given how just the 88 Infanterie divisions deployed had an establishment strength of 858,000 men in their infantry regiments, I don't see how this can be true, unless the definition of "combat strength" used is ridiculously narrow.

Kampfstärke (combat strength)

The Kampfstärke was the strength of the personnel available for actual combat. This excluded the drivers of all non-combat vehicles, horse keepers, administrative personnel, staff of artillery and mortar regiments, and staff of tank destroyer and engineer battalions. Excluded was also signal personnel that did not work either directly alongside, or received signals from, units that were part of the combat strength.

The number included the staff companies at the regimental level and below, messengers, field replacement units, as well as field medical personnel.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Hantar oleh historygeek2021 » 31 Mar 2021, 22:41

How do you arrive at the 90% replacement figure? This chart from DRZW Volume V shows that only 23% of OstHeer losses were replaced through July 1941, and only 37% through August 1941.

DRZW states that by the second half of August, the combat strength of the OstHeer's infantry divisions had fallen to 60 percent, and that of the mobile divisions had fallen to 50%.

Fair question, the answer is that the number you quote doesn't cover all replacements, especially all those in the 'march battalions'. Those on average had 790 per battalion before the fighting even started. For AG-North 24 of their 28 divisions had such a battalion. They covered a bit over 2/3rds of AG-North's losses in June and July. On top of that AG-North received 35,000 replacements from June-August and another 20,000 in September. In their situation this meant that the average infantry battalion was still at 78% strength by October and for motorized battalions it was 82% as their losses were generally lower and they were favored for replacements. That's based on averages given replacements and casualties for the AG. That is all from Liedtke's "Enduring the Whirlwind". AG-North still had 73% of their starting armor strength during the encirclement of Leningrad in September.

AG-Center was doing even better with 161,340 replacements including those from the march battalions vs. 198,398 casualties, so nearly 82% of casualties replaced. Liedtke does some maths and comes up with the figure of over 90% of combat strength retained assuming all replacements were directed toward combat battalions.

Also remember none of those numbers covers wounded returning to units, which were not counted as replacements. This is where Nigel Askey's books come in as he covers the full spectrum of losses (including sick and unfit for non-combat reasons, which was nearly 400,000 men by the end of December) and recovered/replacements 509,000 sick/wounded men were returned to units from July-December 1941, so counting replacements/recuperated vs. all losses for Barbarossa forces there was only a shortage of 223,587 men by the end of December 1941, aka considerably less than 10% of Barbarossa forces. P.178 of his volume IIB of the Operation Barbarossa series with a table breaking everything down by month.

DRZW apparently only counts a very specific category of replacement and makes some very flawed assumptions based on that.

According to DRZW, there were only 90,000 men in field replacement battalions at the start of the campaign. Despite using them all up, there were still 132,000 vacancies in the OstHeer at the start of August.

Even if we include the 20,000 recovered wounded each month, that is still a replacement rate of only 37.9% by the end of July, and 50.34% by the end of August (and this does not taken into account the massive numbers of sick OstHeer personnel who were not evacuated to rear areas).

We are left with the inescapable conclusion of DRZW that by the end of August the combat strength of the OstHeer's infantry divisions had fallen to 60%, and the combat strength of the panzer and motorized divisions had fallen to 50%.

Thus, Stolfi's proposal for Army Group Center to dash ahead into the most powerful concentration of Soviet forces on the Eastern Front, leaving Army Group North and Army Group South to stall out their advances, thereby creating a massive salient stretching from Gomel to Moscow and then back to Velikiye Luki, while the Soviet Union is pouring all its newly created reserve armies around the flanks of an overstretched and badly understrength Army Group Center . seems like a recipe for the disaster at Stalingrad to take place a year earlier at Moscow.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Hantar oleh stg 44 » 01 Apr 2021, 16:09

AG-North would be helping by destroying the Northwest Front and 22nd army of the Western Front on the flank of AG-Center while the majority of the infantry corps hold the Luga Line. AG-South would breach the Dniepr line and exploit that breach per OTL, which was achieved without the help of Guderian since his forces only fought Central and Bryansk Fronts to that point. It was only during the exploitation phase of AG-South's breach of the Dniepr line that Guderian started hitting Southwest Front from the north, but AG-South didn't necessarily need their help, Guderian just sped up the collapse of SW Front. So the flanks wouldn't be stalled or endangered given that Guderian and von Weichs defeated Central and Bryansk Front historically and would be fighting them on the flank here too while helping close/liquidate the Vyazma pocket in August. At that point Central Front was basically defeated anyway and being overrun by von Weichs while Bryansk Front was still forming and what units it did throw against Guderian's flank in his march to Ukraine in August-September were defeated with little effort.

Any reserve armies being created, most of which were immediately occupied against AG-North and South anyway, would be of limited ability to attack and given their history during defense they aren't particularly combat capable, just speed bumps. So the flank threat is heavily exaggerated given actual Soviet historical combat capabilities. Read Glantz's Stumbling Colossus about how bad things were in June and then realize by August Soviet abilities had degraded to levels much worse than even in June and they were desperately throwing the kitchen sink at German forces to little/no avail.

I hate to break it to you, but August 1941 is not November 1942, not least of which due to the lack of experience, Lend-Lease (didn't start until October), and a well grooved mobilization system. Nor is the German army anywhere near as worn down in August-September 1941 as they were by November 1942 after the fighting in Stalingrad and the preceding 16 months worth of losses. You're vastly overestimating Soviet capabilities and overstating German losses.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Hantar oleh historygeek2021 » 01 Apr 2021, 22:01

Which are not counted as replacements in the chart or most sources discussing Barbarossa replacement flows. Can you cite the page in the book with the number of vacancies so I can see the context? Out of a starting force of nominally over 3 million men 132,000 vacancies is extremely low given the scale of the fighting to that point and results achieved. Even taking KDF's Iststarke number for June of 2.7 million that is 4.8% meaning as of August Barbarossa forces were still at 95.2% of their pre-invasion strength. That is even higher than what I claimed.

As I read the chart it says an estimated 20,000 returned combat wounded (not sick or unfit for non-combat causes) of men treated within their armies who were never evacuated. That is on top of recuperated wounded who left their armies for longer term treatment and were shipped back in later, which Askey claims is a specific number per month I have sent him an email so as soon as I get clarification for his source on the claimed number of returned recovered I will post the info here. Askey did document the number of sick/unfit in total, which was about 395,000 from June-December 1941. Over 90% of them returned to their units in less than 30 days.

I don't see how that is accurate given that 132,000 vacancies in August is only 4.8% of the Iststarke of June. Also you haven't demonstrated that all the vacancies were in combat arms either or that it was for infantry in particular. What page of the DRZW volume are you citing for those percentages?

The discussion of the OstHeer's manpower problems begins on page 1009 of Volume V/IB. The cite for combat strength is page 1011.

On page 1014, DRZW states that only 49% of sick troops returned to duty within one month, and another 23% after 2 months.

If you compare the charts on page 1112 (ratio of sick to wounded) and page 1020 (departures and arrivals), you will see that the number of sick in July was roughly 1.75 times the number of wounded, which gives roughly another 300,000 men each month who were out of action due to sickness. Even if most of them returned to readiness in a month or two, there are still roughly 300,000 cases of sickness each month - 300,000 men on top of wounded, missing and killed who are not able to participate in combat.

AG-North would be helping by destroying the Northwest Front and 22nd army of the Western Front on the flank of AG-Center while the majority of the infantry corps hold the Luga Line. AG-South would breach the Dniepr line and exploit that breach per OTL, which was achieved without the help of Guderian since his forces only fought Central and Bryansk Fronts to that point. It was only during the exploitation phase of AG-South's breach of the Dniepr line that Guderian started hitting Southwest Front from the north, but AG-South didn't necessarily need their help, Guderian just sped up the collapse of SW Front. So the flanks wouldn't be stalled or endangered given that Guderian and von Weichs defeated Central and Bryansk Front historically and would be fighting them on the flank here too while helping close/liquidate the Vyazma pocket in August. At that point Central Front was basically defeated anyway and being overrun by von Weichs while Bryansk Front was still forming and what units it did throw against Guderian's flank in his march to Ukraine in August-September were defeated with little effort.

Any reserve armies being created, most of which were immediately occupied against AG-North and South anyway, would be of limited ability to attack and given their history during defense they aren't particularly combat capable, just speed bumps. So the flank threat is heavily exaggerated given actual Soviet historical combat capabilities. Read Glantz's Stumbling Colossus about how bad things were in June and then realize by August Soviet abilities had degraded to levels much worse than even in June and they were desperately throwing the kitchen sink at German forces to little/no avail.

AG North couldn't even destroy the Northwest Front in the OTL when it had the help of Panzer Group 3.

AG South was stretched out trying to find a point on the Dnepr to break through. Its breakthrough at Dneptrotovsk was struggling under Soviet counter-attacks in much the same way as the AGC was at Yelnia (Stahell discusses this in his book on Kiev). In the absence of Guderian's Panzer Group 2, the AG South's bridgehead at Kremenchug was planned to be used for the aid of the panzer corps struggling at Dnepropetrovsk. Zeitzler estimated the combat strength of Panzer Group 1 in early September to be down to one third. Maybe AGS would have captured Dnepropetrovsk, but that would just be extending AG South's salient even further to the east, at a time when the Red Army's strength was rapidly increasing and the OstHeer's was diminishing.

The Soviet reserve armies went where the Germans were attacking. In the OTL, this was Leningrad and the Ukraine. In Solfi's ATL, it would be against AG Center, which the Soviet reserve armies successfully bludgeoned to a halt at Smolensk in the OTL and would do the same in Solfi's ATL. AGC might keep pushing east, but its flanks would get longer and longer while its combat strength got weaker and weaker, while the Red Army's strength got stronger and stronger (thanks to the Southwestern Front not being destroyed in this ATL and no encirclement at Briansk).

Perhaps you should look at what happened to the OstHeer when it overextended in December 1941. Now picture an AGC bogged down in house to house fighting in and around Moscow, the Soviets securely holding Leningrad, and the Southwestern Front intact. All while AGC is holding a long, narrow corridor from Smolensk to Moscow. In the OTL, the Germans could not hold their overextended positions. Why would they be able to do so in Stolfi's ATL?

Even if Germany somehow does hold the Moscow salient, where does that leave the OstHeer in 1942? By May 1942 the Red Army had 5.4 milliion men at the front, and they would be even stronger in this ATL without the encirclements at Kiev and Briansk and the Sea of Azov. Germany only had 2.5 million men at the front in May 1942. How do 2.5 million Germans hold a front with long, narrow salients protruding toward Moscow and Dnepropetrovsk against 5.4 million Red Army soldiers (whose numbers are growing every month)? November 1942 is still coming. The Red Army is still getting stronger. What has Stolfi's ATL accomplished, even if the Germans succeed in capturing and holding Moscow?